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Abstract
The paper provides a rst structural-estimation-based assessment of
an inuential hypothesis that export pioneers are too few relative to so-
cial optimum due to knowledge spillover in new market explorations. Such
market failure requires two inequalities to hold simultaneously: the discov-
ery cost is greater than any individual rms expected prot but smaller
than the sum of all potential exportersexpected prots. Neither has to
hold in the data. We estimate the structural parameters based on the cus-
toms data of Chinese electronics exports. While we nd positive discovery
cost and spillovers, "missing pioneers" are nonetheless a low probability
event.
We thank Wouter Dessein, Amit Khandelwal, Nikhil Patel, Andrea Prat, Daniel Xu, and
seminar participants at the NBER China workshop, Columbia University, USC, Tsinghua
University, and SHUFE for helpful discussions, and especially Daniel Xu for generously sharing
his codes with us, and Nikhil Patel and Lea Sumulong for editorial comments. All errors are
our responsibilities.
1 Introduction
Using a structural estimation approach, this paper aims to gauge the empirical
plausibility of an inuential hypothesis that export activities are prone to a
particular type of market failure, namely, due to knowledge spillovers from the
rst successful exporter to follower rms, there are too few export pioneers
relative to social optimum.
Arrow (1962) may be the rst to formally model the notion that with knowl-
edge spillover from one rms investment to other rms, market failure may oc-
cur if all rms under-invest in these activities. Market failure can be avoided if
the newly discovered knowledge can be patented so that the pioneering rm can
capture the full value of its e¤ort. In international trade context, it has been
argued that "missing pioneers" are particularly likely. When a rm exports a
product to a new market, it has to pay a cost of discovery to learn about local
taste, local regulation, and the appropriate amount of "tinkering" that may be
needed to make the sale possible. If this new knowledge can be costlessly utilized
by subsequent exporters to the same market, there is a gap between the social
value of the rst discovery and the private value to the pioneering exporter.
Because the knowledge about a new export market is hard to patent, export pi-
oneering activities may be less than socially optimal. This type of market failure
has been emphasized in the theoretical models by Ho¤ (1997) and Hausmann
and Rodrik (2003) as a possible explanation for why many developing countries
fail to convert their potential comparative advantage into actual exports. Since
new exports can bring benets to accelerate growth (Lucas, 1993; Kehoe and
Ruhl, 2009; and Amsden, 1992), missing export pioneers and under-exporting
may contribute to economic under-development. Many have cited this possibil-
ity as a basis for supporting government interventions, in the form of subsidizing
export discovery activities (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003; Rodrik, 2004). This
hypothesis is very inuential. For example, the Hausmann and Rodrik (2003)
paper has 1150 citations by Google Scholar count.
Several recent empirical papers provide support for elements of this hypoth-
esis. Freund and Pierola (2010) examine the case of Peruvian exports of nontra-
ditional agricultural products (e.g., asparagus) which didnt grow locally and
were not part of the traditional local diet. Ex post, Peru proves to be good
at producing and exporting these products. But the country did not do so
and probably would not do so except for some serendipitous government in-
tervention via a US foreign aid program. The case study supports the notion
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that a countrys latent comparative advantage needs to be discovered and the
discovery is costly. Artopoulos, Friel, and Hallak (2011) study the beginning
of Argentinian exports of wine, boats, TV programs, and furniture to the US
market, and suggest that, at least in these four cases, the start of exports was
somewhat random, and there was knowledge spillover from the pioneering ex-
porters to follower rms. Of course, for each of these four cases, because the
export pioneering activities did take place, the problem of missing pioneers was
avoided. Nonetheless, one may be tempted to think that such market failure
can happen in many other cases. Indeed, the literature in general appears to
accept the market failure argument. To our knowledge, no paper so far has
concluded formally that "missing pioneers" are a low-probability event.
However, the existence of costly discovery and positive externality do not
automatically imply missing pioneers and a need for government intervention.
Such market failure also requires two inequalities to be satised simultaneously.
First, the discovery cost for entering a new market has to be smaller than the
sum of the expected prots of all potential exporters in that market. Otherwise,
even a social planner would not want to pay the cost to discover that new market.
Second, the discovery cost has to be greater than the expected prot of any
individual rm. Otherwise, some rm will nd it protable to unilaterally pay
the discovery cost in spite of its inability to capture the full value of the discovery,
and the knowledge spillover will take place anyway. Since no presumption exists
in economic theory that either of the two inequalities has to hold, one has to
look at the empirical evidence on these inequalities. As far as we know, no
existing empirical work has taken the approach of assessing both inequalities
simultaneously. Hence, we are not yet able to judge if "missing pioneers" are a
high probability event or not.
In addition, a di¤erent type of market failure may arise that goes in the
opposite direction of "missing pioneers." Sometimes, the social planner may
prefer that no rm enters a particular export market in that period and all
rms wait for at least one more period before entering a new market but some
rms want to do it right away anyway. For example, based on the knowledge
about the distributions of the shocks, the social planner may decide that the
realization of the shocks in the next period is likely to be more favorable in
expectation and the sum of the rms expected prots could be larger if all
rms defer their decisions on being a pioneer to the next period. However, a
would-be pioneer this period may not want to wait and risk losing potential rst-
mover-advantage (FMA) to another rm in the next period. This could produce
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"premature or too many pioneers." While such a possbility is not entertained in
the Ho¤ (1997) and Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) models, both types of market
failure can be investigated in a unied framework.
In this paper, we develop a structural estimation framework to study these
questions. We apply the framework to micro-data on Chinese electronics prod-
ucts (e.g., cameras, radios, radars, and television sets). Specically, we rst
use annual export data during 1996-1999 from the Comtrade database to iden-
tify product-destination pairs that China did not export prior to 2000, then
use monthly customs data to capture all new market explorations during 2000-
2002, and track the export activities of both pioneers and follower rms at the
product-destination level by month throughout 2000-2006. A structural model
and a maximum likelihood estimation procedure (modied from an approach
developed by Roberts et al., 2012) allow us to estimate structural parameters
including the discovery costs, the strength of rst mover advantage, and other
demand and cost parameters. Our identication comes from observing if and
when a new market is explored, who the pioneers are, who the follower rms
are, and how their respective export volumes and unit export values evolve over
the sample period. Armed with these structural parameters, we then make
assessments on the likelihood of both types of market failures.
To preview the main results, we nd positive costs of discovery, evidence
of knowledge spillover from export pioneers to follower rms, and evidence of
rst mover advantage. Most importantly, in spite of the existence of positive
knowledge spillover, we discover that the probability of "missing pioneers" is
generally not very high. One reason for this result is that productivity (and
demand) shocks are su¢ ciently dispersed across rms in reality such that the
probability that no rm wants to be a pioneer is low. On the other hand, the
probability of "premature or too many pioneers" is at least as high as that of
"missing pioneers."
While our paper shares some common features with the existing literature
by allowing for both discovery cost and knowledge spillover, it di¤ers in four im-
portant ways. First, we introduce FMA. This is likely to reduce the likelihood
of missing pioneers. (Note that we allow for but do not impose FMA.) Second,
we use structural estimation to uncover parameter values rather than reduced
form regressions or case studies. Third, we provide the rst-ever assessment
of the likelihood of "missing pioneers" (the percentage of product-destination
pairs for which both inequalities hold). Fourth, we examine both types of mar-
ket failures, not just "missing pioneers." Our conclusion is also di¤erent from
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the existing literature - our results suggest that "missing pioneers" are not a
high probability event in spite of its theoretical plausibility and our empirical
conrmation of knowledge spillovers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review a
larger body of the literature and comment on the contributions of our paper. In
Section 3, we set up a structural model of a rms demand and cost equations
and optimization problem. We pay special attention to when a rm decides to
be an export pioneer in an unexplored market, and when a rm decides to be
a follower exporter when the market has already been explored. We also con-
trast the social planners solution with the decentralized market equilibrium.
In Section 4, we explain the procedure and techniques used to estimate this
non-linear problem with a large number of parameters. We also introduce and
summarize the Chinese export data at the rm-product-destination level over
our sample period, highlighting a few salient features that are particularly rele-
vant for our research questions. In Section 5, we present our baseline estimation
results, including estimates for discovery costs and FMA. In Section 6, using the
structural parameter estimates, we provide an assessment of the probability of
"missing pioneers" and that of "premature pioneers". In Section 7, we discuss
a number of extensions and robustness checks. Finally, in section 8, we provide
concluding remarks.
2 Placing the Paper in Broader Literatures
This paper is related to a larger literature on informational barriers to trade.
Besides Ho¤ (1997) and Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), Wagner and Zahler
(2011) propose a model that features a substantial role for random shocks in
deciding which rm will become a pioneer. In other words, in their model, it is
not necessarily the most productive rm that will become a pioneer. They argue
that this assumption is supported by the rm-product level data on Chilean
exports. This is in contrast with the Melitz (2003) model (see also evidence in
Bernard et al., 2007, and Freund and Pierola, 2010) in which rm productivity
is a key determinant of whether a rm would export or not and how much to
export. In the model we will present, we allow both forces to play a role and
rely on the data to decide on their relative strength. In particular, a permanent
component of rm-level productivity will give the more productive rms an
edge in the export decision, other things equal. However, other things are not
4
held equal as all rms are assumed to face a random xed entry cost to an
export market and a transitory component in both productivity and demand.
The latter assumption is motivated by the work of Wagner and Zahler (2011).
Thus, a less productive rm with a lucky draw of a low xed entry cost could
enter a new destination ahead of an otherwise more productive rm but with
an unlucky draw of a high xed entry cost.
None of the theoretical papers formally states that the existence of discovery
cost and spillover are only the necessary but not su¢ cient conditions for "missing
pioneers." None of the theoretical papers prove that either of the two inequalities
has to hold. This suggests that whether the two inequalities hold or not needs
to be resolved empirically.
We have already noted that several empirical papers have cited the theoret-
ical models and provided empirical support for parts of the story. Prominent
empirical papers include Freund and Pierola (2010) and Artopoulos, Friel, and
Hallak (2011). The key takeaway from these analytical case studies is that the
discovery of a new market is costly. Just because a country can later demon-
strate to have a comparative advantage in producing and exporting a particular
product does not mean that rms from this country on their own would pro-
duce such a product in a free market economy. In addition to showing that a
pioneer rm becomes a pioneer often for random reasons (e.g., a chance visit in
the US), Artopoulos, Friel, and Hallak (2011) and Wagner and Zahler (2013)
also document the existence of spillover from a pioneer to other rms. In their
data, once a pioneer becomes successful, imitators tend to emerge relatively
quickly. Fernandes and Tang (2014) provide both a model and evidence from
China that exporting rms learn about a foreign market from the successes and
failures of other rms. When they test if a rm learns more from a nearby rm
than from another domestic rm that is farther away, they nd no evidence that
distance matters in this case. Why is this the case? If trade associations, trade
shows, and industry conferences at the national level are the primary channels
for information spillover, then distance may matter much less in this case.
We can connect the current discussion on costs of discovering a new market
to another literature that features costly information in international trade in
general, regardless of whether a market is new to the exporting country or not.
Rauch (1996, 1999, and 2001), Rauch and Trindade (2002), and Casella and
Rauch (2003) show that information about a foreign market is costly. Just as
important, they also show that rms often tap into social networks or organize
themselves in ways to overcome the informational barriers. In other words, new
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explorations can successfully take place in markets where information appears
costly even in the absence of government interventions. This makes "missing
pioneers" less likely than it rst appears.
If there are informational barriers to trade, diplomatic services, government-
sponsored trade missions, and export promotion agencies could help alleviate
such barriers. Rose (2007) formally studies this possibility in an extended grav-
ity model and nds support for this, although the trade promotion e¤ect of the
activities of foreign embassies and consulates appears to be quantitatively small.
Nitsch (2007) shows that state visits by foreign leaders are often associated with
a big boost to bilateral trade (with an increase of about 10%), but the e¤ect is
short-lived. Ferguson and Forslid (2013) develop a Melitz-type model of gov-
ernment trade facilitations, which could be applied to opening of embassies and
state visits, and suggest that such facilitations are most useful for medium-sized
rms. Lederman, Olarreaga, and Payton (2009) document that o¢ cial trade
promotion agencies do appear to be associated with an increase in trade. Note
that in these studies, a governments role may not necessarily be about reducing
informational barriers. It could include reducing nancing di¢ culties of export-
ing rms or applying political pressures on a foreign government to re-direct
trade ows away from other trading partners. In other words, they are not a
direct support of the "missing pioneers" hypothesis.
While the relevant empirical papers are numerous, none in our reading uses a
structural estimation approach, and none formally assesses the probability that
both inequalities discussed in the introduction hold simultaneously in the data.
In addition, none of the papers on this topic has simultaneously examined both
the possibility of too few pioneers and that of too many pioneers. In this sense,
our paper lls an important void in the literature.
3 Theoretical Model
We now develop a dynamic structural model for a rms decision on whether it
wants to be a pioneer, a follower, or a non-exporter. In the baseline model, a
rm is assumed to produce a single product, and has to make an entry, stay,
or exit decision in every market in every period. (In our empirical estimation,
we call each HS 6-digit line a product, each HS 4-digit line a sector, and each
individual country a destination. A market is a product-destination pair.)
Our model ultimately produces a system of four equations: (a) a demand
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function, (b) a cost function, (c) for a rm in a mature market, a decision rule on
whether to export to the market, and (d) for a rm in a previously unexplored
market, a decision rule on whether to become a pioneer. Because the last two
equations are non-linear, a general model may have too high a dimension to be
estimated. We will impose restrictions on the parameters so that the number
of parameters is more manageable.
3.1 Demand
We begin with the demand curve for an individual rm that produces product
k. With slight abuse of notation, we use i to denote both an individual rm
and the variety that the rm produces. The demand for rm is variety in
destination d at time t is denoted as
ln sdi (t) = 
d
i (t) + lnY
d
k (t)
where lnY dk (t) is an aggregate demand shifter for product k in destination d
and time t and di (t) is a shifter that is specic to the rms variety. We will
specify the demand in such a way as to capture the possibility of FMA. FMA
refers to the possibility that the demand for the rst exporters variety is higher
than that for those of other rms, but this advantage could be eroded over time.
More precisely, we model the rm-specic term di (t) as:
di (t) = 
d
i   dk ln pdi (t) + Idi (0) (dk   k (t)) + udi (t) (1)
In this expression, the rst term, di , is a rm-specic demand component,
which is observable to the rm before making its production and export decisions
but unobservable to the researcher. The second term, pdi (t), is the price paid by
consumers in destination d for variety i in period t. The third term, Idi (0) (
d
k 
k (t)), is meant to capture the notion of FMA for an export pioneer. Idi (0) is
equal to one for an export pioneer rm and zero for all rms that follow the
pioneer. The initial strength of the FMA is represented by a market-product
specic dk, and it decays over time at a rate of k (t) (until 
d
k   k (t) reaches
zero). Because we do not restrict the values or the signs of these parameters
in the estimation, the specication allows for the possibility of FMA but does
not impose it. We will let the data tell us its presence and strength. Note that
FMA does not appear in the theoretical models by Ho¤ (1997) and Hausmann
and Rodrik (2003). One might conjecture that its presence should make missing
7
export pioneers less likely since a rm would have more reasons to want to be
the rst exporter in a market. The last term, udi (t), is a random noise, whose
distribution will be specied later.
Note that other rmsprices do not appear in the demand function; their
e¤ects on demand are felt indirectly by a¤ecting the aggregate demand shifter
lnY dk (t). This can be derived under a monopolistic competition assumption.
(Note that in our sample, the potential number of exporters for any given 6-
digit product is large, typically over 100. See Table A2 in Appendix 2.A later
for additional details. We use this fact to justify the monopolistic competition
assumption.)
The sales for variety i in destination d, in logarithm, take the form:
ln sdi (t) = 
d
i   dk ln pdi (t) + Idi (0) (dk   k (t)) + lnY dk (t) + udi (t) (2)
Equation (2) will be identied by using data on actual sales by rms in
di¤erent export destinations. The independent variables include price (unit
export value), pdi (t), initial FMA, I
d
i (0) 
d
k; decay rate  Idi (0)k (t), and a rm-
specic demand shock term di . However, since we simultaneously estimate the
system of equations for multiple products (21 in the sample), and the system is
non-linear, we need to impose some further structures on the parameters to make
the computational burden manageable. We make the following assumptions: (1)
dk = 
d + k; 
d
k = 
d. This says that the price elasticity parameter  varies
by destination and product while the FMA parameter  varies by destination
but not by product. (2) k (t) = t. This assumes that the FMA decays at
a linear rate that is common across destinations or sectors. (3) lnY dk (t) =
lnY d + lnYk + lnY (t) :These assumptions are made to reduce the number of
parameters that needs to be estimated.
3.2 Variable Cost
The log marginal cost for rm i to produce and export to market d in period t
is given below:
ln cdi (t) = 
d + k +  (t) + kw ~wi (t) + !i + v
d
i (t) (3)
d is a xed e¤ect component that is common to all rms in a given destination,
whereas k is a xed e¤ect that varies only by product, and  (t) is a xed
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e¤ect that varies only by time period. Collectively, the marginal cost can vary
by destination, product, and time period. However, such an assumption still
rules out those components of costs that vary by location, product, and tari¤,
simultaneously, and in this sense, is restrictive. Allowing generic e¤ects at
the product-destination-time level would substantially increase the number of
parameters, exacerbating computational burdens.
~wi (t) represents a set of observable components that a¤ect a rms marginal
cost. An example of observable components would be the local wage (i.e., wage
at the province-year level where a rm is located). We will also allow rm
ownership and processing trade status to a¤ect marginal cost of production and
exporting.
The last two terms are meant to capture two di¤erent aspects of a rms
productivity. While !i is a permanent or time invariant component, vdi (t) is a
transitory or noise term. Both are unobservable to the researcher although !i is
observed by the rm before making decisions on production and exports. vdi (t)
and udi (t) are noise shocks realized after the rm has made the decisions about
production and exports. We assume that udi (t) and v
d
i (t) follow an i.i.d. joint
normal distribution with mean 0 and variance-covariance matrix :
Under the assumption of monopolistic competition, a prot-maximizing rm
facing the demand in equation (2) will charge a price of
ln pdi (t) = ln

dk
dk   1

+ d + k +  (t) + kw ~wi (t) + !i + v
d
i (t) (4)
where 
d
k
dk 1
is a constant markup.
We will use unit export values as a proxy for prices charged by each rm.
The pricing equation contains a set of destination, product, and period e¤ects
d+k + (t), a rm-specic cost term ~wi (t), and a productivity term !i. The
markup term depends on price elasticity dk which varies by destination and
product. The noise term, vdi (t), can capture, among other things, measurement
errors in the price term. Again, to make the computational burden manageable,
we impose some additional structures on the parameters; in particular kw is
assumed to be the same across all products.
3.3 Firms Decision Rules
We rst consider a mature market that has already been explored by some
exporting rms and therefore where a pioneer rm has already existed. A rm
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obtains a random draw on the xed market entry cost (which can vary by
destination, product, and time period), and decides if it wishes to export to
that market. We then consider a market that has not yet been explored by any
exporter from the same country. In that case, a rm has to decide if it wants
to be the rst exporter (i.e., a pioneer) in that market.
3.3.1 To Be an Exporter or Not?
Consider a market in which a pioneer already exists. For a representative rm
i, the log expected prot before paying the entry cost is
lndi (t) = lnEu;v

sdi (t)
 
pdi (t)  cdi (t)

where Eu;v represents expectation taken over udi (t) and v
d
i (t). Using the pricing
and demand equations before, we obtain the rms log prot as
lndi (t) = ln

1
dk

+ di + I
d
i (0) (
d
k k (t)) +
 
1  dk

Eu;v ln p
d
i (t) + lnY
d
k (t)
(5)
where, substituting all equations into equation (5), and denoting dk =
dk
dk 1
;
we have
lndi (t) = ln

1
dk

+ ln Y dk (t) + ln r
d
i (t) + ln b
d
i (t) (6)
where
ln Y dk (t) = lnY
d
k (t) +
 
1  dk
  
lndk + 
d + k +  (t)

+ Cdk
Cdk = lnEu;v

exp
 
udi (t) +
 
1  dk

vdi (t)

ln rdi (t) = 
d
i +
 
1  dk

(kw ~wi (t) + !i)
ln bdi (t) = I
d
i (0)

dk   k (t)

(7)
In equation (6), the rst term is markup in percentage term. The second
term, ln Y dk (t), captures all factors that are common to all rms in a particular
product line, destination, and time period. It includes both the aggregate de-
mand and common marginal cost terms. The third term, ln rdi (t), is a composite
that captures an unobserved rm and destination-specic permanent demand
shifter di , an unobserved rm-specic permanent productivity shifter !i, and
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observed set of rm characteristics wi (t). The last term, ln bdi (t), captures
FMA.
For a given destination and a given time period, a rm draws an entry cost
di (t), which is independently and identically normally distributed. We assume
the distributions of the entry cost in di¤erent sectors have the same standard
deviation but di¤erent means. (This simplication is again to make the number
of parameters more manageable for the nonlinear estimation). We use  to
denote the set of parameters in this normal distribution1 .
The rm will choose to export to that particular market in that particular
period if and only if the expected prot from doing so exceeds the entry cost:
di (t) > 
d
i (t)
Let us dene the set of state variables as 
it =
n
i; !i; ~wi (t) ; Y
d
k (t) ; b
d
i (t) ; 
d
i (t)
o
.
Assuming that Y dk (t) is a random walk, we can dene rm value as
V (
i;t) = max
Idi (t)2f0;1g
nh
di (t)  di (t)
i
Idi (t) + E [V (
i;t+1) j
i;t]
o
, t  1
(8)
Equation (8) has two parts. The rst part is the current prot of di (t)  
di (t) that the rm obtains by choosing to export today, I
d
i (t) = 1. The second
part is the discounted future value where the discount factor is  2 (0; 1). The
solution to the optimization problem is a cuto¤ rule: if di (t) is smaller than a
cuto¤ value 
d
i (t), then the rm will export.
3.3.2 To Be a Pioneer or Not?
Let us now consider a market not yet explored by a pioneer, and denote the time
period as t = 0. We assume that all rms have the same cost of discovering
any given market (in destination d for product k), which is denoted by F dk .
The discovery cost needs to be paid on top of the xed entry cost discussed
previously. Importantly, the discovery cost needs to be paid only by the rst
exporter and not by follower rms, whereas the xed entry cost needs to be paid
by every exporter. Let us denote the distribution of a rms state variables at
t = 0 as f0 (
i;0). Hence f0 is an aggregate state variable.
For future reference, we use  to denote the probability that at least one rm
will become a pioneer in the next period; naturally,  depends on f0. As long
1 has two components: mean and variance of this normal distribution.
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as some rms are known to want to export in a future period,  = 1; otherwise
 = 0.
Dene a pioneer rms value as V P (
) = V
 

i;t; I
d
i (0) = 1

, and a follower
rms value as V F (
) = V
 

i;t; I
d
i (0) = 0

. We use Idi (0) = 1 to represent that
rm i chooses to be a pioneer, and zero otherwise. Hence the rms optimization
problem at t = 0 is
V (
i;0; f0) = max
Idi (0)
( h
di (0)  di (0)  F dk
i
Idi (0) + I
d
i (0)EV
P (
i;1)
+
 
1  Idi (0)
 
 (f0)EV
F (
i;1) + (1   (f0))E V (
i;1; f1)
 )
(9)
If the rm chooses to be a pioneer, its payo¤ is current prot net of the
discovery cost plus a continuation value EV P (
i;1). If it chooses not to be
a pioneer (Idi (0) = 0), its payo¤ is a convex combination of two possibilities:
(1) if another rm becomes a pioneer next period ( = 1), rm i obtains the
value of a follower rm, EV F (
i;1) (after discounting by one period); and (2)
if no other rm becomes a pioneer ( = 0), its expected payo¤ is E V (
i;1; f1),
since it will face the exact same choices next period as this period of whether
to become a pioneer.
In equilibrium, every rm has a cuto¤ rule. For rm i, if and only if its
entry cost is lower than its cuto¤ value, ~
d
i , will it choose to export. Our timing
assumption is that each rm rst draws its export entry cost, which becomes
observable by all rms. Hence given f0,  is determined. In particular,  = 1 if
maxj

~
d
j   dj (0)

> 0 for at least some j, and  = 0 otherwise.
We can summarize the discussions on both the export decision and the pi-
oneer decision. Using G to denote the cumulative density function (cdf) of a
standard normal distribution, the probability that a rm would become a fol-
lower exporter (in a destination already explored, i.e., in period t > 1), pde , can
be expressed in the following way:
pde
 

di (t)

= Pr
h
  di (t)
i
= G
h

d
i (t)
i
(10)
Similarly, the probability that a rm would become a pioneer in period t = 0,
pdp, can be written as:
pdp
 

di (0)

= Pr
h
  ~di
i
= G
h
~
d
i
i
(11)
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3.4 The Social Planners Problem and Market Failures
We now consider a social planner, whose objective is to maximize the total
value of all rms or the sum of rm values across products and destinations.
The planner chooses whether to ask a rm to enter the market IPdi (t) 2 f0; 1g
in each market and in each period. For a given product and destination, the
planners optimization problem is:
max
IPdi (t)2f0;1g
E0
X
i
f
1X
t=0
ft
h
di (t)  di (t)
i
IPdi (t)g   IPdi (0)F dk g (12)
subject to (5).
Inside the inner most big bracket is the discounted export prot for rm
i. At a given time period t, if the rm is chosen by the planner to export
(IPdi (t) = 1), it earns a prot, 
d
i (t), the same as in Equation (6), net of an
entry cost, di (t). The last term says that rm i must also pay the discovery
cost, F dk , if it is chosen to be the pioneer exporter in period 0.
Since spillover only occurs at the time when pioneering activity takes place,
it is the only time when the social planners solution may di¤er from the de-
centralized equilibrium. Once a pioneer has been chosen (an event in period
0), the planners decision rule (about whether any given rm should export or
not) in subsequent periods would be exactly the same as what the rms would
have chosen on their own in a decentralized market. Hence we can rewrite the
planners problem as:
J (f0) = max
IPdi (t)
X
i
(h
di (0)  di (0)  F dk
i
IPdi (0) + 
 X
i
IPdi (t)
!
E

V P (
i;1)
)
+
 
1 
X
i
IPdi (t)
!
J (f1) (13)
subject to (9).
The rst part of this problem is the sum of the rm values when a rm
has been designated to be a pioneer by the planner. The second part is the
sum of the rm values when no rm is chosen to be a pioneer in period 0.
Let xi = di (0)   di (0), and x =
P
i
h
di (0)  di (0)
i
. Recall our assumption
that aggregate demand is a random walk (and log wage can be veried to be a
random walk as well). Since prot is proportional to exp
 
~wi (t) + lnY
d
k (t)

, x
is a Markov process too. Problem (13) can be simplied as
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J (x) = max

x  F dk ; ExJ (x0)
	
(14)
To see when market failure would emerge, it is instructive to compare when
a central planner would want to designate a rm to be a pioneer based on (13)
and when the rm would want to be a pioneer on its own in a decentralized equi-
librium (9). Given the same initial distribution f0, in a decentralized economy,
rm i will choose to become a pioneer i¤
xi > F
d
k (15)
In the planner problem, at least one rm will be designated as a pioneer i¤
x  F dk > ExJ (x0) (16)
That is, the planner would want a pioneer as long as the total gain of all rms
minus the discovery cost, F dk , is greater than the value of waiting for a period.
(The planner in general would choose no more than one pioneer, and if she wants
a pioneer, would choose the most protable rm to be the pioneer.) Because
the planner and the rms are not solving the same optimization problem, there
is a potential for market failure. We dene "missing pioneers" as an event when
condition (15) is not satised for any rm while condition (16) is satised. In
other words, this type of market failure occurs when no individual rm wants
to be a pioneer but the planner wants a pioneer.
We dene the set of all potential exporters as E0. The probability of "missing
pioneers" could be formally dened as
dk= Pr
"
maxi2E0 
d
i (0)  ~
d
i < 0;
x > F dk + ExJ (x
0)
#
(17)
We now dene a second type of market failure. In particular, there may be
times when the social planner does not wish to have any pioneer this period
(by asking all rms to wait for one period), yet at least one rm wants to be
a pioneer in a decentralized economy. As an example, sometimes the highest
productivity draw and the lowest entry cost draw are such that a rm nds it
protable enough to be a pioneer. Yet, knowing the distributions of the random
shocks, the planner expects the productivity and entry cost draws to be even
more favorable in the next period and therefore would want all rms to wait for
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a period. When this occurs, a pioneer rm could emerge prematurelly relative
to the social optimum. (From the viewpoint of a would-be pioneer, it does not
want to wait because in the next period, a di¤erent rm may become a pioneer
and capture the FMA.) This problem of "premature or too many pioneers"
is the opposite of the "missing pioneers" problem that Hausmann and Rodrik
(2003) stress. The Type-II market failure occurs when
'dk= Pr
"
maxi2E0 
d
i (0)  ~
d
i > 0;
x < F dk + ExJ (x
0)
#
(18)
We explain how we compute the probability of market failure in Appendix
1.B. We utilize the average number of rms that have ever exported in each HS6
product during 2000 to 2002 as a reference, which is shown in Appendix Table
3. We are going to vary E0 to see the changes in dk and '
d
k.
4 Estimation Procedure and Data
4.1 Estimation Procedure
In the data, for each rm i, we observe a sequence of cost shifters ~wi (t), and
a sequence of participation choices Idi (t). When a rm exports, we observe its
unit export value, pdi (t), and export sales s
d
i (t). Let us denote the entire data
set as Df . Our empirical model consists of four structural equations: a demand
equation (2), a pricing equation (4), an export decision rule (10) and a pioneer
decision rule (11). The two decision rules are non-linear, adding substantial
complexity to the estimation. Each equation contains an unobserved permanent
component of productivity shock for a rm, !i, and unobserved demand shifter,
di .
Our estimation strategy utilizes the framework of average likelihood func-
tion, following Arellano and Bonhomme (2011) and Roberts et al. (2012)2 .
Intuitively, we estimate !i and 
d
i using data on an individual rms prices and
quantities, conditional on a set of common parameters. Since the rms export
and pioneering decisions place restrictions on !i and 
d
i , we let the contribu-
tions of these unobserved variables to the likelihood function be weighted by
a specied distribution. Details of the estimation procedure are explained in
Appendix 1.
2We thank Daniel Xu for sharing his estimation codes with us.
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4.2 Data and Identication of Pioneers and Followers
We have monthly rm-product-destination level export data from the Chinese
customs covering the 84 months from January 2000 to December 2006. We have
annual product-destination level export data for China from the UN Comtrade
database for a much longer time period, but the Comtrade data do not have rm-
level information, which is crucial for our research question. Because our system
of four non-linear equations is complex (we have 70 parameters to estimate in
our baseline model even after making a number of simplifying assumptions), it
is wise for us to focus on a subset of sectors in this project.
In this paper, we work with the Chinese exporters of 21 electronics prod-
ucts spanning four 4-digit sectors (HS 8525-8528) in HS Chapter 85 (electrical
machinery and equipment). They are (1) four products from HS8525, trans-
mission apparatus for radiotelephony, TV cameras, and cordless telephones, (2)
three products from HS8526, radar apparatus, radio navigation aid, and remote
control apparatus, (3) nine products from HS8527, reception apparatus for ra-
diotelephony etc, and (4) ve products from HS8528, television receivers etc.
Key features of these four sectors are reported in Appendix 2a.
We call a product-destination pair a market. Based on UN Comtrade data
(available at the bilateral product level), we rst identify a set of markets to
which China did not export to during 1996-1999 but did during 2000-20023 .
We then use the Chinese customs data from 2000-2006 to identify, for each of
the newly explored market, who the rst exporter is, who the followers are, and
how their sales and prices (unit values) evolve. In other words, we identify all
the export pioneering activities (593 in total) during 2000-2002 and trace the
dynamics of both the pioneers and all followers during 2000-2006.
A rm is called a pioneer if it is the very rst Chinese exporter of a particular
product to a particular destination. We call all subsequent entrants (for the
same product-destination pair) as followers. While it is possible to have more
than one pioneer rm for a given product-destination pair, it is extremely rare
in practice. We nd that in 97% of all the newly explored markets during 2000-
2002, there is a single pioneer rm; in the remaining 3% of the cases, there are
two pioneers. There is never a case with more than two pioneers. Therefore, for
practical purposes, it is realistic to assume a single pioneer.
Importantly, when a product is not exported to a particular destination,
some other products (out of our 21) are often still exported to this destination.
3By our procedure, we have bypassed a reclassication of HS codes from 1995 to 1996.
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It is relatively uncommon to have a destination in which none of the 21 products
is exported. This feature of the data is important in our ability to identify
discovery cost parameters (the sum of a product component and a destination
component) and other parameters.
In Appendix Table 3, we report the number of Chinese exporters for each of
the 6-digit products in our sample. In over 75% of the cases (16/21), the number
of exporters exceeds 100. The median and average numbers of exporters are
295 and 394, respectively. This means that these sectors are fairly competitive
and the number of potential exporters is large. For any given destination and
product, the number of exporters tends to be substantially lower (often between
3 and 10). This presumably is a result of rmschoices (e.g., in response to
destination-specic entry costs).
5 Empirical Results
In this section, we apply the structural model to our sample. Recall that our
model estimates price elasticity and FMA by destination, and the discovery
costs are assumed to have both product and destination components. The more
products and countries we include, the more parameters we are going to es-
timate (with the number of parameters growing multiplicatively). To further
reduce computational time, we make two more assumptions. First, we assume
all 6-digit products within a given 4-digit sector share the same parameters.
Second, we cluster all countries into 7 destination regions according to their
geographical and socioeconomic features: (i) US/Canada, (ii) Other countries
in the Western Hemisphere, (iii) Former Soviet Republics (FSR), (iv) Rest of
Europe, (v) Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, (vi) Rest of Asia, and (vii)
Africa. We assume all countries within the same region share the same coe¢ -
cients. For similar computational considerations, Roberts et al. (2012) had to
make similar simplifying assumptions. Even with these simplications, we still
have over 70 parameters to estimate.
These parameters are summarized as follows. In the demand equation, we
have: (1) 7 destination-specic demand price elasticity parameters (d); (2)
3 sector specic demand price elasticity parameters (k) (We will set sector
8525 as the benchmark sector, such that the estimates for all other sectors
are relative to Sector 8525); (3) 7 destination specic parameters for FMA,
d; (4) 1 linear decay rate (); and (5) 14 Aggregate demand dummies (sec-
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tor/destination/time, 3+6+5=14). In the pricing equation, we have: (6) 7
destination-specic cost shifters (d); (7) 3 product-specic cost shifters (k);
(8) 4 time-specic cost shifters  (t); (9) 5 other cost shifters, wi (t), including
3 rm ownership types (majority state owned, wholly foreign owned, foreign-
Chinese jointly owned, with the benchmark being "the others" - mostly domestic
privately owned rms), status of processing trade, and average wage in the city
where a rm is located (the average is computed excluding the rms own wage).
We also have: (10) 9 parameters associated with the ve random variables in
the model. Finally, in the export and pioneer decision rules, (11) there are 10
discovery cost parameters (3 product and 7 destination specic parameters F dk ).
5.1 Demand and FMA Estimates
Table 1 reports the estimates of the demand equation parameters (equation (2)).
The rst panel of Table 1 reports price elasticities dk. For example, the price
elasticity for sector HS8525 in the US/Canada region is -1.265, indicating that
an increase in price by one percent is associated with a decline in export sales by
1.265%; the result is statistically signicant. In the second part of the table, the
paramters for initial FMA are positive for all regions and statistically signicant
for all but one regions (JPN/KOR/AUS/NZL). The initial FMAs range from
0.218 for Japan/Korea/Australia/New Zealand to 2.922 for US/Canada. A
linear per-period decay rate  is estimated to be -0.120; while it has the expected
sign, it is not statistically signicant.
5.2 Pricing Equation Estimates
Table 2 reports parameter estimates of the pricing equation (equation (4)). Our
estimates suggest that rms involved in processing trade have a lower marginal
cost, and rms located in higher-wage cities have a higher marginal cost. While
the rst parameter is statistically signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 1% level,
the second estimate is not statistically signicant.
Interestingly, our estimates suggest that state-owned rms (SOEs), Sino-
foreign joint ventures (JVs), and foreign wholly owned rms (FIEs) have mar-
ginal costs that are 0.70%, 1.47% and 0.67% higher than domestic private rms
(the left-out group), respectively. It might be useful to comment on why foreign
invested rms have a higher marginal cost than domestic private rms. Rel-
ative to domestic private rms, foreign-owned rms might choose to produce
higher-quality varieties, which would require higher-cost inputs and therefore a
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Parameter Mean Standard Deviation
Price elasticity-US/Canada -1.265*** 0.085
Price elasticity-Other western hemisphere -1.171*** 0.033
Price elasticity-Former Soviet Republics -1.180*** 0.036
Price elasticity-Rest of Europe -1.104*** 0.027
Price elasticity-JPN/KOR/AUS/NZL -1.143*** 0.056
Price elasticity-Rest of Asia -1.157*** 0.026
Price elasticity-Africa -1.163*** 0.029
Price elasticity-sector 8526 -0.045 0.034
Price elasticity-sector 8527 -0.036 0.043
Price elasticity-sector 8528 -0.369*** 0.038
FMA-US/Canada 2.922*** 1.039
FMA-Other western hemisphere 0.776*** 0.303
FMA-Former Soviet Republics 1.456*** 0.341
FMA-Rest of Europe 1.382*** 0.302
FMA-JPN/KOR/AUS/NZL 0.218 0.446
FMA-Rest of Asia 0.872** 0.301
FMA-Africa 1.489 0.310
Linear decay rate -0.120 0.076
Table 1: Parameters in Demand Equation
Notes: Aggregate demand coe¢ cients for section, destination, and period are not reported.
*** and ** denote statistically signicant at the 1 % and 5 % levels, respectively.
higher marginal cost; but they may also be better managed which would imply
a lower marginal cost. The net e¤ect on the marginal cost depends on the rela-
tive strength of these two forces. Our estimates indicate that the higher quality
e¤ect dominates the better management e¤ect.
5.3 Parameters for the Random Variables
There are ve random variables in the model. First, a permanent rm-specic
demand shock, di , in the demand equation, and a permanent rm-specic pro-
ductivity draw, !i, in the marginal cost function are jointly log normally distrib-
uted. Second, a transitory demand shock, udi (t), in the demand equation, and
a transitory productivity shock, vdi (t), in the marginal cost function are also
jointly log normally distributed. Finally, for every rm in every market in every
period, there is a random xed entry cost, di (t), that is independently and nor-
mally distributed. As specied, not all moment parameters can be identied.
Following Roberts et al. (2012), we impose a value of one for the standard de-
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Parameter Mean Standard Deviation
SOE cost add-up 0.702*** 0.032
JV cost add-up 1.471*** 0.044
FIE cost add-up 0.670*** 0.041
Local wage 0.091 0.070
Processing status -0.142*** 0.031
Table 2: Parameters in Pricing Equation
Notes: 14 coe¢ cients for destination, period, and sector xed e¤ects are not reported to save
space; *** denotes statistically signicant at the 1 % level.
viation of the export entry cost, di (t), but leave its mean to be a parameter to
be estimated. While we allow for non-zero correlations between the permanent
components of the demand and productivity shocks, and between the transitory
components of the demand and productivity shocks, we assume independence
between the permanent and the transitory shocks.
There are in total nine parameters. We report the estimation results in Table
3. We note that the standard deviation for the permanent demand shock is more
than 10% greater than that for the permanent productivity shock. This pattern
is consistent with the ndings reported in Roberts et al. (2012) for Taiwanese
footwear exporters. A relatively big dispersion of the persistent demand shock
across rms may reect dispersion in product quality across rms or dispersion
in consumer taste over varieties.
The average xed entry cost is estimated to be 11% of the mean one-period
rm prot. Since we can back out rmssales and costs in monetary terms, we
infer that the average xed entry cost into an export market per period is RMB
51,116 (or about US$ 8,244).
5.4 Discovery Cost Parameters
Estimates of the discovery costs in each sector and destination region are pre-
sented in Table 4. The discovery costs are expressed in multiples of the average
rm value. (The average rm values di¤er by sector and region.) To infer rm
value from one-period rm prot, we need an assumption on the discount factor.
Assuming a discount factor of  = 0:9, we can infer that the average rm value
across all sectors and regions is about 446,220 RMB, and correspondingly, the
discovery cost on average is about 156,180 RMB (about US$ 25,200, or 35% of
the average rm value) from Table 4. Note, while the exact monetary values
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Permanent Shocks
Mean Standard Deviation
Productivity -0.035 1.893***
(0.028) (0.018)
Demand -0.039** 2.139***
(0.017) (0.023)
corr 0.554***
(0.014)
Transitory Shocks
u 1.753***
(0.137)
v 0.737***
(0.155)
corr 0.121
(0.134)
Export Cost/Prot
 0.11 1
(0.10)
Table 3: Parameters for the Random Variables
Notes: *** and ** denote statistically signicant at the 1 % and 5 % levels, respectively.
Standard errors are reported in brackets.
of the discovery costs require an assumption on the discount factor, subsequent
assessments of market failures do not depend on the exact monetary values of
the discovery costs and therefore are independent of this assumption.
Because the discovery costs are assumed to be paid by a pioneer rm in a
given market but not by follower rms, our nding of positive discovery costs
also implies evidence of informational spillover from pioneer rm to all follower
rms. In this sense, we conrm the ndings in Freund and Pierola (2010) and
Artopoulos, Friel, and Hallak (2011) that positive spillover exists.
6 Market Failures in a Decentralized Economy
As we have stated earlier, the missing pioneer problem occurs if and only if two
inequalities are satised simultaneously. First, the discovery cost for entering a
new market has to be smaller than the sum of the expected prots of all potential
exporters in that market. Otherwise, even a social planner would not want to
pay the discovery cost to discover that new market. Second, the discovery cost
has to be greater than the expected prot of any individual rm. Otherwise,
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HS8525 HS8526
Mean Std Mean Std
US, Canada 0.36*** 0.10 0.65*** 0.04
Other western hemisphere 0.42*** 0.14 0.56*** 0.10
Former Soviet Republics 0.49*** 0.09 0.56*** 0.08
Other European countries 0.26 0.32 0.40** 0.20
JPN/KOR/AUS/NZL 0.46*** 0.09 0.33*** 0.16
Rest of Asia 0.36* 0.19 0.66*** 0.10
Africa 0.55*** 0.09 0.68*** 0.07
HS8527 HS8528
Mean Std Mean Std
US, Canada 0.05 0.05 0.41*** 0.09
Other western hemisphere 0.63*** 0.08 0.51*** 0.11
Former Soviet Republics 0.59*** 0.08 0.42*** 0.12
Other European countries 0.62*** 0.07 0.31 0.26
JPN/KOR/AUS/NZL 0.58*** 0.06 0.45*** 0.09
Rest of Asia 0.63*** 0.08 0.46*** 0.13
Africa 0.74*** 0.06 0.59*** 0.10
Table 4: Discovery Costs in Multiples of Average Firm Value
Notes: Std=standard deviation. ***, ** and * denote statistically signicant at the 1 %, 5 %
and 10 % levels, respectively.
some rm will nd it protable to unilaterally pay the discovery cost in spite of
its inability to capture all the value of the discovery, and the knowledge spillover
will take place anyway.
We have also discussed a second type of market failure - the problem of pre-
mature pioneering activities - which is markedly di¤erent from the Hausmann-
Rodrik hypothesis.
6.1 Probabilities of Market Failures
We now reect on the probability of market failure as a function of the potential
number of entrants. Even without doing any structural estimation, we may
conjecture that the relationship between the probability of "missing pioneers"
and the number of potential exporters should resemble an inverse V. At one
extreme, if the number of rms is one, it is clear that there is no market failure,
because the social planners and the individual rms optimization problems
coincide (dk = 0). At the other extreme, if the number of rms is innite (and
the productivity distribution is not bounded on the right, which is satised if
productivity distribution is normal, log normal, or Pareto), then some rm is
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bound to get a productivity draw so high that it wants to be the pioneer anyway
even if there is knowledge spillover to other rms. Therefore, the probability of
"missing pioneers" is likely to have an inverse-V shape. This is the limit of our
intuition. How fast does the probability of "missing pioneers" increase when the
number of rms increases? Where does the probability peak? How fast would
the probability decline after it peaks? We will have to use structural parameters
and simulations to answer these questions.
Fixing a particular value for the number of potential exporters in E0, we com-
pute probability of market failure dk by randomly drawing rms, and plotting it
in Figure 1. (This refers to the fraction of all product-destination combinations
for which both inequalities hold simultaneously.) We present the probability of
"missing pioneers" (Type-I Market Failure) in the left graph, and the probabil-
ity of "premature pioneers" (Type-II Market Failure) in the right graph. In the
left graph, we plot three lines: the probability that no rm would want to be-
come a pioneer in a decentralized market (maxi2E0 
d
i (0) di +EV (
i;1; 1) 
EV (
i;1; 0) < F
d
k ), the probability that the social planner prefers to have a
pioneer, (x > F dk + ExJ (x
0)), and the probability that both are true. We
vary the number of entrants from 1 to 200 rms. (Recall the mean and me-
dian numbers of exporters across the 21 products in the data are 394 and 295,
respectively.) As we can see, the probability that no single rm would want
to become a pioneer rms starts at a relatively high number (over 97%), and
decreases relatively fast as the number of potential entrants increases. This is
consistent with the notion that free-riding by follower rms becomes more se-
vere when the number of potential free riders increases. On the other hand,
the probability that the social planner prefers to have a pioneer starts very low,
and increases as the number of entrants increases. Logically, the probability of
"missing pioneers" - the probability that both conditions satised - should be
lower than the smaller of the two. Because "no rm wants to be a pioneer" and
"the planner wants a pioneer" are not independent events, the probability of
"missing pioneers" turns out to be lower than the lower envelope of the other
two curves.
In the right graph, the probability that some rms want to be a pioneer
rises with the number of potential exporters, while the probability that the
planner does not want a pioneer (in a given period) declines in the number
of potential exporters. The probability of Type-II market failure also has an
inverse-V shape. Relative to the probability of "missing pioneers," however, the
probability of "premature pioneers" reaches a higher peak, and declines less fast
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Figure 1: Probability of market failures
with the number of potential exporters.
To summarize, our structural estimation produces interesting results. In
particular, we nd that "missing pioneers" - emphasized by Hausmann and
Rodrik (2003) and the existing literature on market failure in export activities -
are a low probability event. If the number of potential exporters is equal to the
mean (394) or the median (295) in the data, the probability of "missing pioneers"
is essentially zero. Even if we search for the number of potential exporters that
would maximize the probability of "missing pioneers," the peak probability is
still less than 20%. On the other hand, "premature pioneers" are somewhat more
likely than "missing pioneers." This seems to turn the conventional wisdom in
this literature on its head.
6.2 When are missing pioneers more likely to occur?
The nding that "missing pioneers" are a low probability event is not a prede-
termined outcome by our specication. To see this, we now try to explore how
the dispersions of productivity and demand shocks (relative to the magnitude
of the discovery costs) a¤ect the likelihood of market failure. Our intuition is
that when the dispersions are small, the probability of missing pioneer can be-
come very large. For instance, we can think of an extreme case when there is
no dispersion and all rms are identical. (This extreme case happens to be the
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assumption used in the model of Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). Imagine there
are 100 identical potential exporters in a market. The expected prot from ex-
porting for each rm is $100 but the cost of discovery is $500. In this case, no
individual rm wants to be a pioneer because its expected prot is lower than
the discovery cost. Yet, clearly, the social planner wants to designate a rm
to be a pioneer because the total expected prot across all rms is $1 million,
far exceeding the discovery cost. We can verify this intuition in our model too.
Specically, we will vary the size of the dispersions of the permanent demand
and productivity shocks while keeping all other parameters xed. Of course,
we can also vary the size of the discovery cost while keeping the dispersions
constant.
In the left graph of 2, we plot the probability of "missing pioneers" corre-
sponding to three di¤erent values of permanent productivity dispersion across
rms ( = baseline estimate of 1.893, 0.5, and 0.1, respectively), while keep-
ing all other parameters at the values of their baseline estimates. Clearly, as
the productivity dispersion becomes smaller, "missing pioneers" become more
likely.
In the right graph of 2, we progressively reduce the size of permanent de-
mand dispersion across rms ( = baseline estimate of 2.139, 0.5, and 0.1,
respectively), while keeping all other parameters at the values of their base-
line estimates. Clearly, as the demand dispersion becomes smaller, "missing
pioneers" also become more likely.
In the left graph of 3, we progressively increase the discovery cost (discovery
cost = baseline estimate, 1.5 x baseline, and 2 x baseline, respectively), while
keeping all other parameters at the values of their baseline estimates. Clearly,
as the discovery cost becomes greater (and therefore positive spillover becomes
more severe), "missing pioneers" become more likely.
Finally, in the right graph of 3, we simultaneously lower the dispersions of the
productivity and demand draws across rms and raise the discovery cost. We
can see clearly that the probability of "missing pioneers" increases even more.
In fact, when the dispersions for both productivity and demand draws are 0.1,
and the average discovery cost is twice the baseline estimate, the probability of
"missing pioneers" can reach nearly 100% very quickly and stay very high even
as the number of potential exporters increases to 200.
We conclude from this exercise that a low probability of missing pioneers
is not an articial outcome of our specication. In the data, productivity and
demand shocks are su¢ ciently dispersed across rms (relative to the size of the
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Figure 2: Varying dispersions
discovery costs) so that it is not likely for the "missing pioneers" problem to
arise. To put it di¤erently, the homogenous rm assumption in the model of
Ho¤ (1997) and Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) turns out to be a key for their
conclusion of market failure.
7 Extensions and Robustness Checks
We now explore a number of robustness checks and extensions.
7.1 Dynamic Setup
We extend our benchmark model into a dynamic environment. In the demand
equation, we introduce a consumer loyalty e¤ect. In particular, if a rm has
exported to a particular market in a previous period, then the demand for its
variety is potentially higher in this period:
ln sdi (t) = 
d
i   dk ln pdi (t) + Idi (t  1) + Idi (0) (dk   k (t)) + lnY dk (t) + udi (t)
(19)
In (19), Idi (t  1) is an indicator function. It is 1 if the rm exported last pe-
riod, and 0 otherwise. Hence a positive value of  captures the idea of consumer
loyalty. Note that we do not impose consumer loyalty but merely allow it in our
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Figure 3: Varying discovery cost
specication. The notion of "consumer loyalty" di¤ers from FMA. While FMA
can only be enjoyed by the pioneer rm, consumer loyalty applies to follower
rms too.
Once we allow consumer loyalty, the rms decision problem in (8) becomes
dynamic. In other words, the export decision in one period will a¤ect the prof-
itability of exporting in the subsequent period. This adds substantial complexity
to our estimation. To save space, we explain our estimation procedure in Online
Appendix 3.A, and do not tabulate the results. We only note that the coe¢ cient
on consumer loyalty is 0.79 and statistically signicant (and all other parameter
estimates are similar to the baseline case). Hence we nd empirical support for
the notion of consumer loyalty. While the estimation is more involved, it turns
out the inference on the probabilities of the two types of market failures are
qualitatively similar to the benchmark model. Quantitatively, the probability
of "missing pioneers" is even lower. This is perhaps intuitive: the possibility of
consumer loyalty should induce rms to be more willing to export and to do so
sooner rather than later.
7.2 Shutting Down FMA
To see the importance of FMA in our inference, we shut down the FMA in this
section. In the benchmark case, we assume a pioneer rm receives a boost in its
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export sales at the beginning and then gradually decays to 0. Now we assume
in the demand equation (2),  =  = 0. Hence pioneer rms do not have any
advantage at the beginning. Without FMA, rms could become more reluctant
to be a pioneer.
We report the results in Online Appendix 3.B. It turns out that the prob-
ability of "missing pioneers" is stil low in this case, with the peak probability
being below 20% (when the number of potential exporters is around 40). The
probability of "premature pioneers" is also low.
7.3 Possible Biases from Using Chinese Data
We reect on possible biases introduced by the use of Chinese data. Since
exchange rate undervaluation could promote entries into new export markets
(Freund and Pierola, 2012), the rst concern is that an undervalued Chinese
currency could articially boost export pioneering activities, resulting in a lower
estimated probability of market failure. While there are frequent suggestions of
an undervalued Chinese yuan during 2003-2011, both narrative reporting before
2003 and data suggest that the exchange rate was not undervalued during 2000-
2002, the period in which export pioneering activities take place in our sample.
In Figure 4, we plot the forward Chinese exchange rate (units of Chinese yuan
per US dollar) minus the spot exchange rate for both 12 months forward and 3
months forward. A positive number means that the forward market is predict-
ing that the Chinese nominal exchange rate would depreciate in the subsequent
3 or 12 months. From late 2003 to 2011, the forward spot di¤erence was always
negative, indicating that the market was expecting a Chinese exchange rate ap-
preciation. This was consistent with the expectation that the Chinese exchange
rate was undervalued during that period. In contrast, until November 2002,
the forward spot di¤erential was largely positive, which suggests that the mar-
ket believed that the Chinese exchange rate was overvalued and a depreciation
rather than an appreciation would have to come soon. Frankel and Wei (2007)
also suggest that the RMB was not undervalued before 2003, and postulate that
the switch in market assessment of the Chinese exchange rate was started by US
Secretary of Treasury John Snows actions at a G-7 meeting in late September
2003, and Undersecretary John Taylors testimony before Congress on October
1, 2003.
Note that from January 1994 to July 2005, the Chinese nominal exchange
rate was always xed at 8.2 RMBs per US dollar. This means that there were
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Figure 4: RMB/dollar Forward Rate (1998-2013)
no active government actions adjusting the nominal exchange rate during these
11.5 years. If there were exchange rate manipulation, it was done by neglect-
ing to adjust the nominal exchange rate. Since prices and wages can adjust
upward (though maybe more di¢ cult to adjust downwards), it is hard to keep
the real exchange rate undervalued anyway. Indeed, China did not succumb to
a temptation to devalue during the Asian nancial crisis of 1997-1999 as most
other countries in Asia did, and was praised by the United States and others
for not changing its nominal exchange rate (Frankel and Wei, 2007). If one
takes the position of currency manipulation, one would have to say that the real
exchange rate was manipulated to discourage exports during 1994-2002 before
it was switched to encourage exports during 2003-2011. In any case, using the
forward market as a guide, the Chinese exchange rate was likely overvalued dur-
ing 2000-2002, which should bias against nding a low probability of missing
pioneers.
The standard measure of real e¤ective exchange rate su¤ers from the problem
of ignoring trade in intermediate goods and global value chains. Once one makes
the correction (Patel, Wang, and Wei, 2014), the Chinese real exchange rate
both on a multilateral basis and relative to the US dollar exhibited a steady
and strong appreciation since 2000.
The second concern is that export subsidies by the Chinese government may
also boost export pioneering activities, resulting in a lower observed frequency of
market failure. There is no shortage of Chinese trading partners alleging Chinese
export subsidies. During 2004-2010, there were a total of 43 countervailing duty
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(CVD) cases (i.e., cases alleging illegal export subsidies) at the WTO against
Chinese exporters involving 47 four-digit sectors, or 71 case-sector pairs. (Note
that each case may contain multiple sectors, and a given sector may be involved
in multiple cases.) There were no CVD cases against China before 2004. Six
sectors were most frequently targeted. They are HS7306 (tubes, pipes, and
hollow proles, 8 cases), HS7304 (seamless tubes, and pipes, 5 cases), HS7604
(aluminum bars, rods and proles, 3 cases), HS8418 (refrigerators, freezers and
heat pumps, 3 cases), HS4810 (paper and paperboard, 3 cases), and HS7608
(aluminum tubes and pipes, 3 cases). Importantly for this study, none of the
four sectors used in our sample has ever been subject to CVD lawsuits. That
is, no country has ever complained to the WTO of illegal export subsidies in
Chinese exports of HS8525-8528. In fact, it is relatively uncommon for any of the
48 sectors in Chapter 85 to be subject to CVD cases. Only three sectors in this
chapter, HS8505 (electromagnets and permanent magnets), HS8516 (electric
heaters for water, space, and soil), and HS8517 (electric apparatus for telephone
sets) were ever subject to a CVD case, each involving a single complaint country,
accounting for 6.4% (3/47) of the sectors or 7.3% (3/41) of the cases ever subject
to CVD cases. We therefore conclude that export activities in our sample were
unlikely to have been boosted by government export subsidies.
Chinese exporters face more antidumping cases than CVD cases. Most an-
tidumping cases do not involve government export subsidies; many may be
judged to be protectionist in nature for a fair-minded economist. Indeed, Chinas
WTO accession agreement was written in such a way that it was relatively easy
for a trading partner to impose antidumping duties on Chinese exporters (Bown,
2005). We can take a very conservative approach and regard each antidumping
case as potentially involving export subsidy. During the period 2000-2010 there
were 707 antidumping cases against Chinese exports involving 351 four-digit
sectors. Only once was one of the sectors in our sample (HS8528 "color televi-
sion receivers") subject to an antidumping law suit (which was lodged by the
United States in 2003). In that case, the US International Trade Commission
eventually imposed an antidumping duty of 78.45% to Chinese TV exporters4 .
As a robustness check, we exclude this sector from our data and re-estimate the
model. However, we still nd a low probability of missing pioneers.
The third concern is that China might have superior export performances
than other countries in sector HS8525 to 8528, resulting in less observed market
4See http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/investigations/2004/
color_television_receivers_from_china/nal/PDF/fr_commerce_order.pdf for details.
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failure. By superior export performance, we mean the export growth from
extensive margin (export to new product-country pairs) might be much greater
than that from intensive margin (export to existing product-country pairs) in
China than in other similar countries. If this is true, the use of Chinese data
could produce an atypically low and unrepresentative probability of market
failure. To check whether such problem exists, we decompose export growth
of China and comparators (Brazil, India, Japan, Poland, Czech Republic, and
Italy) from 2000 to 2002 into extensive and extensive margins. The results are
reported in Appendix 3.C. As it turns out, China didnt stand out in terms of
extensive margin growth when compared to these countries.
7.4 Dropping Smaller/Poorer Economies
In the baseline estimation, we assume that the parameters are the same for
all countries within a given region (in order to reduce computational burden).
However, the probability of market failure could be either higher or lower for
richer/larger countries than for poorer/smaller ones. On the one hand, ex-
ploratory activities may be more costly in larger or richer economies (e.g., due
to higher costs of advertisement or hiring of a consultant), implying a higher
probability of "missing pioneers". On the other hand, costs of dealing with
corruption and regulatory barriers could be lower in more developed economies,
implying a lower probability of "missing pioneers". To formally link the size of
the discovery cost to a countrys size, income level, and other characteristics,
and allow them to vary by sector and region, would add many more parameters.
This would increase the computational time substantially. Instead, we take a
short cut and re-estimate the model on two smaller samples and compare the
results with our baseline case.
Our rst sample variation is to drop countries with less than 1 million peo-
ple in 2000. This reduces the number of newly conquered markets (product-
destination pairs) during 2000-2002 from 593 markets involving 157 countries
in the baseline case to 509 markets involving 134 countries. Our second sam-
ple variation is to drop all countries with either less than 5 million people or
with per capita income less than US$500 in 2000. In the reduced sample, the
number of newly conquered markets shrinks further to 299 product-destination
pairs involving 71 countries.
We estimate the model for each of the reduced samples, and report the results
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in terms of the probability of market failure in Appendix 3D. We nd that
probability of "missing pioneers" is still low in an absolute sense. Comparing
these results with the baseline case, it appears that the probability of "missing
pioneers" tends to be a bit lower and the probability of "premature entrants"
tends to be higher when we restrict our attention to richer and larger markets.
7.5 Additional Learning Channels
In the benchmark case, we assume there is only one learning channel - follow-
ers can learn from pioneer rms in the same product-destination pair. In this
subsection, we broaden the set of channels a rm can learn about export via-
bility. In particular, we allow four additional learning channels, to be captured
by four additional parameters that are related to an expanded set of observable
rm characteristics in equation 4. The rst is a rms own export value of dif-
ferent products to the same destination in period t-1, which captures learning
about the destination from ones own past exports. Albornoz et al. (2010) have
explored this idea in a reduced-form estimation. The second is a rms own
export value of the same products to di¤erent destinations in period t-1, which
captures learning about the product from ones own past exports regardless of
destinations.
Besides learning from a rms own experience, we also explore possible learn-
ing from other rmsexperience. Fernandes and Tang (2012) study the spillover
e¤ects of other exporters on new exporters. Therefore, our third new channel is
learning about a given destination through other rmstotal exports of di¤erent
products to the same destination in period t-15 . The fourth channel is learning
about the product through other rms export value of the same product to
di¤erent destinations in period t-1.
If any of the learning channels is operational, we expect it to result in a
reduction in the marginal cost. Moreover, we expect that learning from ones
own experience is (at least weakly) more powerful than learning from other rms
experience. However, we do not impose these restrictions in the estimation. The
set of state variables 
di now includes these four additional variables
6 . Note that,
5Fernandes and Tang (2012) also examine whether learning dissipates with physical dis-
tance but nd no evidence in favor of this hypothesis. For this reason, we do not incorporate
this feature. Incorporating such a feature in our non-linear system would have substantially
complicated the estimation.
6We keep equation (2) the same and change equation (4) by augmenting ~wi (t). Hence
~wi (t) includes not only the rms ownership, processing trade status, and local wage, but also
four new variables that captures learning from own experience and learning from other rms.
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by changing the marginal cost, these modications also change the probability
of export in equation (10). Therefore, these additional learning channels could
also change the pioneering decisions and therefore the probabilities of "missing
pioneers" and "premature pioneers."
Using the expanded set of structural parameters, we re-compute the prob-
abilities of Type-I and Type-II market failures, respectively. The results are
presented in Appendix Figure 5 in Appendix 3.D. Compared to the baseline
case, we nd that the probability of "missing pioneers" has now dramatically
declined, with the peak probability not even reaching 2%. In contrast, the proba-
bility of "premature pioneers" has generally increased, with the peak probability
reaching close to 45%. These changes in the probabilities of market failures are
consistent with the intuition that, by reducing the marginal cost (and increasing
the expected prot from exporting), the additional learning channels make it
more likely for rms to want to be a pioneer.
7.6 Intermediary Firms
Intermediary rms are rms that specialize in exports and imports but may
not be producers themselves. They play an important part in facilitating trade
(see Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei, 2011, for a model of intermediary rms and
evidence from China). It is natural to ask whether they have helped to reduce
the probability of market failure. Data show that around 20% of Chinese export
transactions or 2% of the export value in sectors HS 8525-8528 during 2000-2006
were carried out by intermediaries. Because we do not live in a world without
intermediary rms, we cannot formally estimate the probability of market failure
in a world without them.
We can gauge the importance of intermediary rms in export pioneering
activities in the following way: we focus on a subsample with direct producers
only. More specically, we exclude those new markets where the rst exporter is
an intermediary rm, and pretend intermediary rms do not exist even if they
are follower rms. With these modications, we re-compute the probabilities of
Type-I and Type-II market failures and report the results in Online Appendix
3.E. (In this estimation, we allow for "consumer loyalty" as in Section 7.1;
dropping "consumer loyalty" does not qualitatively change the conclusion.)
Here is the key nding: without giving credit to intermediary rms in con-
quering new markets, the probability of market failure tends to be moderately
Then equations (10) and (11) are also changed since state variables in 
di are augmented too.
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higher than the corresponding case presented in Section 7.1 (but lower than
the baseline case without the "consumer loyalty" e¤ect but with intermediary
rms). To summarize, our key conclusion of a low probability of the "missing
pioneers" problem does not appear to be materially a¤ected by the presence or
absence of intermediary rms.
7.7 Common Markets
We have dened a market as a pair of a 6-digit product and a country. However,
some countries have formed a customs union or a common market with identical
policy barriers on imports from non-member countries (and sometimes with free
mobility of capital and labor among member countries). There are ve common
markets in our sample: the European Community (EC), the Caribbean Common
Market (CARICOM), the Central American Common Market (CACM), MER-
COSUR, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
7 . One could make a case for assuming that only one discovery cost needs to be
paid to enter a given common market. Once an exporter reaches one member
country, it can reach all other member countries in the same customs union.
We now investigate the consequence of this assumption for our main con-
clusion. Specically, we treat a common market as a single destination. With
the correspondingly new denition of a market, 444 new markets were explored
during 2000-2002. We re-estimate the structural model, re-compute the proba-
bilities of Type-I and Type-II market failures, and report the results in Appen-
dix 3.F. Compared to the baseline case, we nd that this extension results in a
lower probability of "missing pioneers" but a higher probability of "premature
pioneers." Our interpretation is that, by allowing a single discovery cost for en-
tering all countries within a common market, this change in assumption raises
the expected prot from the pioneering activities and therefore makes it more
attractive for rms to become pioneers.
7.8 Market Failure in Exporting Brand New Products
The analysis so far has focused on possible market failure in discovering new
markets when rms export existing products to new destinations. A di¤erent
type of discovery involves rms exporting brand new products to the world mar-
ket. We now make an attempt at gauging the likelihood of "missing pioneers"
7Memberships in these common markets are spelled out in Online Appendix 3.F.
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in this type of activity in the manufacturing sector. First, we estimate the set
of manufacturing goods in which China may have potential comparative ad-
vantage by 2002 based on the export bundles of both China and other similar
countries. Second, we compute the fraction of such goods that China did not
export during 2000-2002.
To dene a set of countries similar to China during 2000-2002, we look at
all countries whose per capita income is within (-20%, +50%) of the Chinese
level ($1135 in 2002). There are 20 such countries: Kazakhstan ($1658), Tuvalu
($1621), Kosovo ($1587), Cabo Verde ($1480), Belarus ($1479), Samoa ($1454),
Albania ($1363), Morocco ($1363), Vanuatu ($1354), Egypt ($$1286), Syria
($1270), Honduras ($1197), Paraguay ($1135), Swaziland ($1131), Philippines
($1005), Nicaragua ($995), Turkmenistan ($970), Guyana ($962), Congo ($920),
and Indonesia ($910).
For each country on this list, we consider each of their HS 6-digit manufac-
turing export products as a potential comparative advantage product for China.
Note that 6-digit HS code is the most disaggregated level of product classi-
cation that is common across countries. By this method, the set of similar
countries jointly export 4084 products (out of a total of 5110 manufacturing
products). This is a set of products that countries similar to China collectively
show a revealed comparative advantage. (We use the term "revealed compara-
tive advantage" more broadly than the traditional usage as our goal is to catch
the set of products that China could be exporting.) Let us call this set A. They
are part of the "potential comparative advantage products" for China.
During 2000-2002, China exported a total of 4125 manufacturing products,
which constitute a set of revealed comparative advantage products for China.
Let us call this set R. The two sets of products do not overlap perfectly. In
fact, there are 100 products that the set of "similar countries" exported but
China did not. Let us call this set M. We might dene R+M as the set of goods
that China has potential comparative advantage; that is, these are the goods
that China or a country with a similar level of income could conceivably export.
R+M=4225.
Some of the products in M may be ones for which China has no genuine
comparative advantage. For example, some "similar countries" may export
processed gold products because they happen to have an abundant gold reserve
but gold is scarce in China. But to err on the side of capturing the upper bound
of "missing pioneers," we regard all goods in M as reecting Type-I market
failure. In this case, the probability of Type-I market failure in exporting brand
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new products is M/(R+M) = 100/4225 = 2.4%.
Not all products in M are equally important in the export bundles of the
"similar countries." Judging by the export value in 2002, the top 10 products in
M are: HS 854219 "Monolithic digital integrated circuits", HS 710812 "Gold in
other unwrought forms", HS 482359 "Other paper and paperboard", HS 481012
"Paper and paperboard", HS 710813 "Gold in other semi-manufactured forms",
HS 410410 "Whole bovine skin leather", HS 440320 "Other coniferous tropical
woods", HS 854214 "other monolithic digital integrated circuits", HS 560730
"Other hard bres", and HS 410421 "Other bovine leather". If interventions
are deemed desirable, these are presumably some of the potential export items
that rms can be encouraged to look into. Note that three of these products
(HS 481012, 560730, and 854214) are exported by three or fewer countries only;
they might not represent genuine potential comparative advantage products for
China.
Overall, the probability of Type-I market failure in exporting brand new
products appears low for China. Nonetheless, it is possible that the probability
is higher for smaller economies or at a product level that is more disaggregated
than the 6-digit HS level.
8 Concluding Remarks
The paper aims to assess the empirical plausibility of a highly cited hypothesis in
the international trade literature, namely export pioneering activities are prone
to market failure. Existing empirical papers tend to focus on documenting that
discovery of a new market is costly and that knowledge spillover to follower rms
exists. We recognize that a positive discovery cost and spillover are necessary
but not su¢ cient for the existence of market failure. For market failure to occur,
two inequalities would have to hold simultaneously. No existing paper in the
literature has formally assessed the empirical likelihood of these inequalities.
Our goal is to employ a structural estimation approach to perform such an
assessment.
We conrm the existence of a positive discovery cost and spillover in export
pioneering activities. We also nd evidence supporting the existence of rst
mover advantage in the export context. While the notion of FMA is widely
discussed in the industrial organization literature, it surprisingly has not been
featured in the theoretical or empirical literature on possible market failures in
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export pioneering activities. In any case, the main contribution of the paper is to
use structurally estimated parameters to formally assess the likelihood of both
inequalities. We nd that the probability of "missing pioneers" is generally
not very high in spite of its theoretical plausibility. Furthermore, we point
out a seond type of market failure, that of "premature pioneers," and show
evidence that "premature pioneers" are at least as likely as "missing pioneers."
These conclusions appear robust in a number of extensions and checks we have
examined.
There are two categories of contributions from the paper: (a) a new frame-
work to assess two types of market failure in export pioneering activities, and (b)
an application to the Chinese data. The framework can in principle be applied
to rm-product-destination-time data from other countries. Such applications
could allow one to eventually develop insight about how country characteristics
may a¤ect probabilities of market failure. We leave such exercises to future
research.
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1 Appendix: Estimation Procedure
In the data, for each rm i, we observe a sequence of cost shifters wi (t), and
a sequence of participation choices Idi (t). When a rm exports, we observe
its unit export value, pdi (t), and export sales s
d
i (t). Let us denote the entire
data set as Df . Our empirical model consists of four structural equations:
a demand equation (2), a pricing equation (4), an export decision rule (10)
and a pioneer decision rule (11). The two decision rules are non-linear, adding
substantial complexity to the estimation. Each equation contains an unobserved
permanent component of productivity shock for a rm, !i, and unobserved
demand shifter, di . Our estimation strategy utilizes the framework of average
likelihood function, following Arellano and Bonhomme (2011) and Roberts et
al. (2012)1 . Intuitively, we estimate !i and 
d
i using data on an individual
rms prices and quantities, conditional on a set of common parameters. Since
the rms export and pioneering decisions place restrictions on !i and 
d
i , we
let the contributions of these unobserved variables to the likelihood function be
weighted by a specied distribution.
The parameters in the demand, pricing, and export equations are denoted
by  =
n
d; k; Y
d
k (t) ; ; 
d; d; k;  (t) ; kw;;  ; F
d
k
o
. All parameters in
 are to be estimated structurally. We denote the joint distribution of rm
is unobserved shocks i; !i as a weighting function f (; !). Then an average
likelihood function is dened as
l (Df j) =
Z
l (Df j; ; !) f (; !) d!d
where l (Df j; ; !) is the likelihood function if ; ! were observed.
l (Df j; ; !) =
Y
d;t
g

ln
 
sdi (t)

; ln pdi (t) ; 
Idi (t)G hdi (t) ; iIdi (t) h1 Gdi (t) ; i1 Idi (t)
G

~
d
i ; 
Idi (0) h
1 G

~
d
i ; 
i1 Idi (0)
where G is the cdf of a normal distribution (with g denoting its probability
density function).
Similar to Roberts et al. (2012), our likelihood function has two parts. The
rst is the contribution of the rmsexport sales and prices, and the second is the
1We thank Daniel Xu for sharing his estimation codes with us.
1
contribution from the rmsdecisions on pioneer and export status. Following
Roberts et al. (2012), we use a Gibbs sampler to simplify computation. In
particular, we rst estimate the demand and pricing equations to obtain common
demand and cost parameters, and then use a exible polynomial function to
approximate the latent payo¤ if rm i exports to market d at time t and then
use MCMC to update our guesses on  and !.
The rm-specic demand and cost components are sampled rm by rm and
we can estimate their joint distribution. Assuming (; !) follow a joint normal
distribution with the vector of parameters W 2 , we Bayesian-update W in each
iteration from the previous sampling step. We explain the estimation technique
in more details in the following.
Denote the parameters in demand equation (2) as n =

dk; ; 
d

and para-
meters in pricing equation (4) as m =
 
d; k;  (t) ; w

. Then the parameters
that need to be estimated is  = (n;m;;  ). At the start of simulation round
s, estimation results in step s   1 is denoted as ns 1; ms 1, s 1;  s 1. And
unobserved rm shock is denoted as
 
!s 1; s 1

and their joint distribution
parameters as bs 1;W s 1. Then we update our estimation in the following
way:
(1) Conditional on s 1;we can estimate ns from demand equation (2)
ln sdi (t)  d;s 1i =  dk ln pdi (t) + Idi (0) (d   t) + udi (t)
(2) Conditional on ns; s 1; !s 1, we can update ms from pring equation (4)
ln pdi (t)  ln

dk
dk   1

  !i = d + k +  (t) + w ~wi (t) + vdi (t)
(3) We get residual terms udsi (t) ; v
ds
i (t) from step 1 and 2, and then update
after estimation of s
(4) Dene the latend payo¤ if rm exports (including pioneer decision)
V dei (t)  V dni (t) = H


i;t; I
d
i (0) = 1

+ ^
d
i (t) (1)
~V dei (t)  ~V dni (t) = H


i;t; I
d
i (0) = 0

+ ^
d
i (t) (2)
Here we use V dei (t) ; V
dn
i (t) to denote pioneer rm value if exports or not
exports and ~V dei (t) ; ~V
dn
i (t) denote follower rm value if exports or not exports.
2W includes a mean and a variance -covariance matrix.
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Here ^
d
i (t) denotes the noise term. We normalize its standard deviation to be 1.
Firm will export i¤ latent payo¤ is greater than 0. H is a polynomial function
which approximates the latent payo¤. In our estimation, we use a linear function
as H. It contains: (i) Time dummies to capture aggregate demand lnY (t); (ii)
Destination dummies to capture Cduv + lnY
d; (iii) Product dummies to capture
lnYk; (iv) A term capturing
 
1  dk
  
lndk + 
d + k +  (t) + w ~wi (t)

; (v)
FMA Idi (0)

d   t

; (vi) Unobserved shocks di ;
 
1  dk

!i.
In the pioneer equation, we approximate the latent payo¤ equation with a
linear function again.
V dei (0)  ~V dni (0)  F dk = Hx


i;0; F
d
k

+ ^
d
i (t) (3)
Hx contains: Destination dummies, product dummies, a term capturing 
1  dk
  
lnd + d + k + w ~wi (t)

and unobserved shocks di ;
 
1  dk

!i.
Conditional on ns;ms, !s 1; s 1 and s then draw  s using
Y
d;t
G
h

d
i (t) ; 
iIdi (t) h
1 G


d
i (t) ; 
i1 Idi (t)
G

~
d
i ; 
Idi (0) h
1 G

~
d
i ; 
i1 Idi (0)
(5) Update !s; s using a Gibbs sampling procedure: draw !s; s from a
normal distribution with parameters bs 1;W s 1. Accept the new draws with
probability
p = l (Df j; ; !)
(6) Then we update estimation of bs;W s using new !s; s.
1.A Identify F dk and Export Cost 
We need to solve four rm value functions: V dei (t) ; V
dn
i (t) ;
~V dei (t) and ~V
dn
i (t)
which mean pioneer rm value if exports or not exports and follower rm value
if exports or not exports.
(1) Given productivity !s; s, then we solve follower rm value function of
not exporting by solving the following value function
~V dni (t) = E
nh
max [H (t+ 1) ; 0] + ~V dni (t+ 1)
io
Then ~V dei (t) is dened by ~V
dn
i (t) +H (t) :
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(2) Let Tx = [ 
d
 ] then Tx is the number of periods when pioneer rm FMA
disappears. Then pioneer and follower rm tend to be same. Starting from
period Tx, we can backward induct to solve pioneer rm as
V dni (t) = E

max [H (t+ 1) ; 0] + V dni (t+ 1)
	
and V dei (t) is dened by V
dn
i (t) +H (t) :
(3) Comparing the di¤erence between Hx and V dei (0)  ~V dni (0) then we can
identify F dk .
(4) We compute expected rm prot di (t) from equation (6). Comparing
linear approximation result H (t) and di (t) we have


di (t)  i (t)

_ H (t)
In other words, latent payo¤ H (t) is subject to a scaling parameter  to
di (t)  i (t).
(5) We guess the mean of export cost  and then compute scaling parameter
 by dividing H (t) by di (t)    . Then we check the standard deviation of
residual 

di (t)  i (t)

to be 1 or not.
1.A.1 Compute Market Failure
We compute market failure in this way.
(1) Start with an initial guess J (x)
(2) Get the distribution of x0. In one simulation, xing the number of en-
trants N , we randomly draw N rms from the population. From this sample
we evaluate Hx and ~V dni at t = 1. V
de
i (1)   ~V dni (1) = Hx


i;1; F
d
k

+ F dk
. Then randomly assign i to each rm. If planner chooses 1 rm to be-
come pioneer, then he must choose the rm whose V dei (1)   ~V dni (1)   i
is largest. Let us call this rm as i. For all other rms, we dene x0i =
max(V dei (1)   ~V dni (1)   i; 0) + ~V dni (1) and rm i as V dei (1)   i : Dene
x0 =
P
xi. Evaluate J on x0
(3) Repeat step 2 a larget number of times and get Ex0J (x0)
(4) Update J from
J (x) = max

x  F dk ; Ex0J (x0)
	
(4)
Go back to step 1 until J converges.
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True Parameters Estimation std
 2 1.992 0.0149
 0.4 0.7019 0.0915
 0.1 0.0888 0.0316
lnY 1 0.9909 0.0268
 0 -0.0181 0.0252
d 0 0.0341 0.0193
k 0 -0.0586 0.0223
w 1 -0.4374 1.1097
=V0 0.3388 -0.189
F=V0 1.3552 1.5099 -
std() 0.1 0.197 -
std(!) 0.1 0.206 -
Table 1: Parameters Comparison
(5) Redo step 2 at period t = 0 to get xi = V dei (0)  ~V dni (0) i. And x =
Pn
max(V dei (0)  ~V dni (0)  i; 0) + ~V dni (0)
o
+V dei (0) i .Then ifmaxi2E0 xi <
F dk ; x > F
d
k + Ex0J (x
0). we record 1 market failure.
(6) Repeat (5), then we can count the number of market failure in our
simulation.
When we compute the aggregate of market failure across destinations and
sectors, we assume when we randomly draw the rm, we do not distinguish
the sector and destination in the population sample. In other words, we get
a di¤erent samples with di¤erent composition of market and sector in each
simulation.
1.B Evaluate linear approximation
To evaluate the linear approximation, we assign parameters to the model and
then simulate sample. Then we use the code to estimate the sample. The results
comparison are reported in Table
In the gure 1, we get the probability of market failure using the true para-
meters and the model prediction. The top left gure is probability of missing
pioneer when we use our linear approximation strategy to compute. The top
right gure is the true probability of missing pioneer. The bottom two gures
are probaility of too many entrants. We can see that results from our linear
approximation is quite close to the true gures.
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Figure 1: Comparing True and Estimated Probabilities
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2 Appendix: Chinese data - Additional Details
2.A Identifying New Markets, Pioneers, and Followers
We have monthly rm-product-destination level export data from the Chinese
customs covering the 84 months from January 2000 to December 2006. We have
annual product-destination level export data from China from the UN Comtrade
database for a much longer time period, but the Comtrade data do not have rm-
level information, which is crucial for our research question. Because our system
of four non-linear equations is complex (we have 70 parameters to estimate in
our baseline model even after making a number of simplifying assumptions), it
is wise for us to focus on a subset of sectors in this project. (As we have noted
earlier, our approach can in principle be applied to other sectors and indeed to
the customs level export data from other countries.)
In this paper, we work with the Chinese exporters of 21 electronics products
spanning four 4-digit sectors (HS 8525-8528) in the HS Chapter 85 (electrical
machinery equipment). We call a product-destination pair a market. Based
on UN Comtrade data (available at the bilateral product level but no rm-level
information), we rst identify a set of markets for which China did not export to
during 1996-1999 but did during 2000-20023 . We then use the Chinese customs
data from 2000-2006 to identify, for each of the newly explored market, who
the rst exporter is, who the followers are, and how their sales and prices (unit
values) evolve. In other words, we identify all the export pioneering activities
(593 in total) during 2000-2002 and trace the dynamics of both the pioneers and
all followers during 2000-2006.
Importantly, when a product is not exported to a particular destination,
some other products (out of our 21) are often still exported to this destination.
It is relatively uncommon to have a destination in which none of the 21 products
is exported. This feature of the data is important in our ability to identify
discovery cost parameters (the sum of a product component and a destination
component) and other parameters.
Our 21 products come from four consumer electronics sectors from Chapter
HS85 (Electrical Machinery and Equipment). They are (1) four products from
HS8525, transmission apparatus for radiotelephony, TV cameras, and cordless
telephones, (2) three products from HS8526, radar apparatus, radio navigation
3We start the Comtrade data in 1996 in order to bypass a reclassication of HS codes from
1995 to1996.
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sector HS8525 HS8526 HS8527 HS8528
average annual growth rate, 2000-2002 46.8% 6.6% 1.8% 36.6%
export share in HS85 in 2002 10.6% 0.1% 4.6% 3.6%
export share in China in 2002 1.8% 0.0% 0.8% 0.6%
export share in the world of the same sector in 2002 7.8% 1.7% 20.5% 7.6%
number of 6-digit products 4 3 9 5
number of markets (# product x 220 countries) 880 660 1980 1100
% of total # markets accounted by:
existing markets by end of 1999 21% 11% 43% 35%
newly explored markets during 2000-2002 23% 9% 9% 14%
unexplored markets as of end of 2002 56% 80% 49% 51%
Total number of exporters (for all products) in 2002 641 255 2185 1024
mean [median] # exporters per product in 2002 160 [160] 85 [29] 243 [295] 205 [103]
mean [median] # exporters per existing market in 2002 6 [2] 5 [2] 10 [4] 8 [3]
mean [median] # destinations a rm exported to in 2002 3 [1] 2 [1] 4 [1] 4 [1]
Table 2: Sample Distribution of Sector 8525-8528
aid, and remote control apparatus, (3) nine products from HS8527, reception
apparatus for radiotelephony etc, and (4) ve products from HS8528, television
receivers etc. Key features of these four sectors are reported in the rst panel
of Table 2.
Note that by the end of 1999, these four sectors had entered di¤erent numbers
of markets. Therefore the remaining space for new market exploration during
2000 to 2002 was di¤erent ex ante. In particular, HS8526 was relatively under-
explored by the end of 1999 whereas HS8527 was relatively more explored.
The distribution of the matured markets as of end of 1999, newly discovered
markets during 2000-2002, and still unexplored markets as of the end of 2002
are summarized in the second panel of Table 2.
A rm is called a pioneer if it is the very rst Chinese exporter of a particular
product to a particular destination. We call all subsequent entrants (for the
same product destination pair) as followers. While it is possible to have more
than one pioneer rm for a given product-destination pair, it is extremely rare
in practice. We nd that in 97% of all the newly explored markets during 2000-
2003, there is a single pioneer rm; in the remaining 3% of the cases, there are
two pioneers. There is never a case with more than two pioneers. Therefore, for
practical purposes, it is realistic to assume a single pioneer.
In Table 3, we report the number of Chinese exporters for each of the 6-
digit products in our sample. In over 75% of the cases (16/21), the number
of exporters exceeds 100. The median and average numbers of exporters are
295 and 394, respectively (table 3). This means that these sectors are fairly
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product total exporters US/Canada Other western FSR Europe JPN/KOR Rest of Africa
hemisphere /AUS/NZL Asia
HS852719 1019 127 6 3 13 46 10 2
HS852713 1019 149 10 1 10 47 13 2
HS852812 1008 54 7 5 8 41 28 7
HS852530 823 78 9 1 14 43 13 3
HS852520 778 102 4 3 19 74 16 3
HS852732 542 64 7 4 5 21 7 1
HS852739 533 80 5 1 12 29 7 1
HS852731 467 38 4 5 5 10 16 9
HS852540 456 66 1 2 5 28 7 2
HS852813 352 34 3 2 5 13 6 6
HS852712 295 54 1 2 6 21 4 1
HS852692 187 36 3 2 8 21 8 4
HS852821 152 27 2 3 5 11 3 1
HS852721 130 17 1 4 2 6 2 1
HS852822 115 11 1 2 2 9 2 1
HS852691 109 21 3 2 4 10 2 1
HS852790 95 5 1 1 1 7 2 1
HS852510 61 9 1 1 1 3 2 1
HS852610 48 8 1 1 1 3 1 1
HS852729 46 4 2 2 1 2 2 1
HS852691 34 5 1 0 1 2 2 1
Sample Mean 394 47 3 2 6 21 7 2
Sample Median 295 36 3 2 5 13 6 1
Table 3: Average Number of Entrants
competitive and the number of potential exporters is large. For any given des-
tination and product, the number of exporters tends to be substantially lower
(often between 3 and 10). This presumably is a result of rmschoices (e.g., in
response to destination-specic entry costs).
2.B Descriptive dynamics in the new markets
We now provide some descriptive dynamics of pioneers and followers in the
markets that are rst explored during 2000-2002. Let us call the month in
which export pioneering activity takes place Period 1. We dene Period 2 as
the rst 12 months following the export pioneering activities, Period 3 as the
second 12 months following the export activity, and so on. Given the constraint
of our data, we focus on the rst 5 periods.
Panel (a) of Table 4 summarizes the number of exporters that are ever
presented in each new market since its emergence untill the end of 2006, as well
as the number of active rms in each period. For each indicator, we report the
90th percentile, the mean and median value. In addition to the full new market
9
(a) All new markets
90th percentile mean median
# of exporters ever present 32 13 5
# of active rms in each period
period1 1 1 1
period2 3 2 1
period3 6 3 2
period4 9 4 2
period5 14 6 3
(b) New markets survived through 2006
90th percentile mean median
# of exporters ever present 42 18 10
# of exporters ever present
period1 1 1 1
period2 3 2 1
period3 6 3 2
period4 10 4 3
period5 14 7 4
Table 4: Average Number of Entrants
Note: In sector of HS8525-8528, the 90th percentile, mean and median of rm numbers in
each mature markets in 2000 are 23, 9 and 3.
sample, we also list the corresponding statistics for new markets that survived
through 2006 (there are 394 such cases). The results are presented in Panel (b)
of Table 4. It shows that the average number of entrants in each period is very
small for both samples. Even in period 5, corresponding to the fourth year after
the emergence of new markets, on average only 6-7 rms entered (the median
numbers are 3 and 4, respectively).
It is useful to compare the characteristics of pioneers versus followers to
reveal the role of rm heterogeneity. (Recall that some consider pioneering ac-
tivities occur for purely random reason; See Wagner and Zahler (2013) ). In
comparison, Melitz-style models tend to imply that a rm with a high produc-
tivity is more likely to be a pioneer (see Bernard et al., 2007, and Freund and
Pierola, 2012, for evidence in this direction). Table 5 lists some cost and export
characteristics of pioneers and followers. Due to data limitations, we only con-
sider three cost variables4 : (1) whether the rm is a processing exporter, (2) its
4The data used in our estimation are all obtained from the General Administration of
Customs of China, which shed little light on rms cost variables, such as wage and capital.
Although some researchers have employed a matched dataset between the customs data and
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ownership type, and (3) city-level local wage (using data at the year of 2000)
where the rm is located. Panel A of Table 5 reports that 40% of the pioneer
rms engaged in processing trade, compared with 39% for the followers. Mean
comparison test shows the di¤erence between a pioneer and a follower is not
statistically signicant. The ownership type seems to matter a lot for a rms
sequence of entry. 57% of pioneers are state-owned enterprises (SOE), 11% are
foreign-invested rms (FIE), and 17% are joint ventures (JV). As a compari-
son, 26% of followers are SOEs, 25% are FIEs, and 25% are JVs. Besides, the
local wage for pioneers is lower than that for followers, indicating that pioneer
rms on average have cost advantages. The di¤erences between pioneers versus
followers in terms of both ownership and local wage are signicant at 1% level.
However, these statistics need to be re-considered given the fact that before
2002, only a small proportion of non-SOEs in China were permitted to export
abroad. Most of the domestic private rms and many foreign invested rms had
to export through intermediary trading rms, most of which were SOEs. This
indicates the role of SOE might be exaggerated.
Panel (b) reports the statistical result based on a sub-sample of rms that
are manufacturing rms rather than intermediaries. It is found that the patterns
are similar to the full sample, only with less distinction on the share of SOEs
between pioneers and followers. The di¤erence regarding processing share is
more signicant than before. Panel C further compares the initial export value
and export experiences of pioneers and followers. We focus on new markets
emerged in 2001 and 2002 in Panel C (385 markets), so that we could study
the rmsinitial characteristics in 2000, before any rm made entry decisions
into the new markets yet. Data show that pioneers have better performances in
terms of being a larger exporter, with more relevant export experience to the new
market (both on the product side and destination side). Specically, the average
export value of pioneers was 500 million in 2000, compared with 124 million for
followers. In addition, 43% of pioneers had exported the same product to other
countries and 35% exported other products to the same country, which are both
signicantly higher than followers.
Note that in our structural model, we allow a rms marginal cost to be a
Chinas annual survey of manufacturing rms to gain more detailed cost information, this
wont work for our study. Our estimation requires the full sample of pioneers and correspond-
ing non-pioneers to identify the discovery cost and FMA. However, in our selected sector
only 44% of the rms (3356 out of 7694 rm-market pairs) could be matched, and around
64% of the pioneer rms are out of this sample. As a substitute, we use the city-level local
wage to reect rms labor cost, where local wage are calculated using rm-level data in the
manufacturing survey data.
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Variable Pioneer Follower Mean comparison
A. Full sample
Processing rm 40% 39% Insignicant
SOE 57% 26% Signicant at 1%
FIE 11% 25% Signicant at 1%
JV 17% 12% Signicant at 1%
Local wage 1.05 1.15 Signicant at 1%
B. Non-intermediary rm
Processing rm 61% 56% Signicant at 5%
SOE 35% 18% Signicant at 1%
FIE 20% 38% Signicant at 1%
JV 31% 18% Signicant at 1%
Local wage 1.09 1.15 Signicant at 1%
C. Entrant for new market emerged in 2001 and 2002
Mean export value in 2000 (million) 500 124 Signicant at 1%
Exported of this product in 2000 43% 9% Signicant at 1%
Exported to this country in 2000 35% 14% Signicant at 1%
Table 5: Comparison between Pioneers vs. Followers
function of rm ownership, whether it is a processing exporter or now, and local
wage rate (as well as of its productivity and other terms).
We now report some naive statistics on the dynamics of pioneers and fol-
lowers for our sample. This is not to replace the subsequent dynamic structural
estimation, but to highlight some basic patterns in the data. Two dimensions
are considered in each period: (1) the pioneer rms leading position, and (2)
market concentration. To measure the rst dimension, we classify the pioneers
export value into three groups: (i) pioneer rm was one of the largest two Chi-
nese exporters in the new market, (ii) pioneer rm exported to the new market
but was neither of the largest two, and (iii) pioneer rm didnt export. To
measure the second dimension, market concentration, we adopt the largest two
exportersmarket share and cluster them into ve groups: (i) (75%, 100%], (ii)
(50%, 75%], (iii) (25%, 50%], (iv) (0%, 25%], and (v) no export. Here market
share is calculated by rms export quantity over total export quantity of all
Chinese exporters in that market and period. A pioneer is considered to be the
most successful if it is in the leading position of a concentrated market. The
reason we use the largest two exportersmarket share to measure market con-
centration, instead of the top 4s as in typical IO literature, is due to the actual
number of exporters in each given period is normally small (see Table 4).
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3 Appendix: Extensions - Additional Details
3.A Dynamic Setup
We extend our benchmark model into a dynamic environment. In the demand
equation, we introduce a consumer loyalty e¤ect. In particular, if a rm has
exported to a particular market in a previous period, then the demand for its
variety is potentially higher in this period:
ln sdi (t) = 
d
i dk ln pdi (t)+Idi (t  1)+Idi (0) (dk k (t))+lnY dk (t)+udi (t) (5)
In (5), Idi (t  1) is an indicator function. It is 1 if the rm exported last
period 0 otherwise. Hence  captures the idea of consumer loyalty. Note that
we do not impose consumer loyalty but merely allow it in our specication. The
notion of "consumer loyalty" di¤ers from rst mover advantage (FMA). While
the FMA can only be enjoyed by the pioneer rm, consumer loyalty applies to
follower rms too.
Once we allow consumer loyalty, the rms decision problem in (8) becomes
dynamic. In other words, the export decision in one period will a¤ect the
protability of exporting in the subsequent period. This adds substantial addi-
tional complexity to our estimation. To save space, we explain our estimation
procedure in an appendix, and do not tabulate the results. We note that the
coe¢ cient on consumer loyalty is 0.79 and statistically signicant (and all other
parameter estimates are similar to the baseline case). Hence we nd empirical
support for the notion of consumer loyalty. In gure 2, we report the results of
market failure. While the estimation is more involved, it turns out the infer-
ence on the probabilities of the two types of market failures are similar to the
benchmark model.
In order to see more clearly the curve for the probability that conditions
hold, we also re-produce the curve in the lower left graph (note that the scale
of the vertical axis is now changed to 10 to the power of -3.) The probability
of market failure peaks at 11% (when the number of rms =20), decreases to
0 very quickly. In other words, in more than 89% of the cases, the problem
of missing pioneers does not occur because some rm nd it worthwhile to be
a pioneer. Therefore, in spite of clear evidence of positive discovery costs and
spillover, market failure of the missing pioneers type is not a high probability
event.
In the two graphs in the right column, we trace out the probability of pre-
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mature pioneers (also labeled as "Type-II market faiulre"). In the upper right
graph, we use a long broken line to trace out the probability that at least one
rm wants to be a pioneer; this rises as the number of potential exporters in-
creases. We use a short broken line to trace out the probability that the social
planner does not want any rm to be a pioneer (in a given period); this is a
decreasing function in the number of potential exporters. The solid line traces
out the probability of premature pioneers. As we have anticipated, it resembles
an inverse U. The probability of type-II market failure peaks at 24% when the
number of potential exporters is 50. The lower right graph simply reproduces
the curve representing the probability of type-II market failure when the scale
of the vertical axis is adjusted.
3.B Shutting Down FMA
To develop some idea for the importance of FMA in our inference, we attempt
to articially shut down the FMA in this section. In the benchmark case, we
assume a pioneer rm receives a boost in its export sales at the beginning
and then gradually decays to 0. Now we assume in the demand equation (2),
 =  = 0. Hence pioneer rms do not have any advantage at the beginning.
The probability of market failure is shown in gure 3. The peak probability
is higher than the baseline model, about 16% while the slope of the curve is
smaller. When there is no FMA, the probability that no rm wants to be a
pioneer increases. Hence it drives the rst type market failure increases and the
second type market failure decreases.
3.C Dropping Smaller/Poorer Economies
In the baseline estimation, we assume that the parameters are the same for
all countries within a given region (in order to reduce computation burden).
However, the probability of market failure could be either higher or lower for
richer/larger countries than for poorer/smaller ones. On the one hand, ex-
ploratory activities may be more costly in a larger or richer economies (e.g., due
to higher costs of advertisement or hiring of a consultant), implying a higher
probability of market failure. On the other hand, costs of dealing corruption
and regulatory barriers could be lower in more developed economies, implying
a lower probability of market failure. To formally link the size of the discovery
cost to a countrys size, income level and other characteristics, and allow them
14
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Figure 2: Dynamic model
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Figure 3: Shutting down FMA
to vary by sector and regions, would add many more parameters. This would in-
crease the computational time substantially. Instead, we re-estimate the model
on two smaller samples and compare the results with our baseline case.
Our rst sample variation is to drop countries with less than 1 million peo-
ple in 2000. This reduces the number of newly conquered markets (product
destination pairs) during 2000-2002 from 593 markets involving 157 countries
in the baseline case to 509 markets involving 134 countries. Our second sam-
ple variation is to drop all countries with either less than 5 million people or
with per capita income less than US$500 in 2000. In the reduced sample, the
number of newly conquered markets shrinks further to 299 product destination
pairs involving 71 countries.
We estimate the model for each of the reduced samples, and report the
results in terms of the probability of market failure in Figure 4. Market failure
of missing pioneers is still low in some absolute sense. Comparing these results
with the baseline case, it appears that the probability of missing pioneer tends
to be a bit lower and probability of too many entrants tends to be higher when
we restrict our attention to richer and larger markets.
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Figure 4: Excluding Smaller Countries
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3.D Additional Learning Channels
In the benchmark case, we assume there is only one learning channel - followers
can learn from pioneer rms in the same product destination pair. In this sub-
section, we broaden the set of channels a rm can learn about export viability.
In particular, we allow four additional learning channels, to be captured by four
additional parameters that are related observable rm characteristics ~wi (t) in
equation (4)5 . The rst is a rms own export value of di¤erent products to the
same destination in period t-1, which captures learning from ones own exports
to the same destination. Albornoz et. al (2010) explores this idea. The second
is a rms own export value of same products to di¤erent destinations in pe-
riod t-1, which captures learning from exports of same products regardless of
destinations.
Besides learning from the rms own export experience, we also explore the
learning from other rms. Fernandez and Tang (2012) study the spillover e¤ects
of other exporters on new exporters. Therefore, our third new learning channel
is through other rmstotal exports of di¤erent products to the same destination
in period t-16 . The fourth learning channel is through other rmsexport value
of the same product to di¤erent destinations in period t-1. These modications
also change the probability of export in equation (10). The set of state variable

di now includes these four additional variables
7 .
Using the expanded set of structural parameters, we re-compute the prob-
ability of market failure and present it in gure 5. It shows that comparing to
the benchmark case, probability of missing pioneer increases and probability of
too many entrants declines.
3.E Intermediary Firms
Intermediary rms are rms that specialize in exports and imports, and may
not be a producer themselves. They play an important part in facilitating trade
5 In other words, ~wi (t) contains ownership, wage, processing status and also four additional
learning variables now.
6Fernandez and Tang (2012) also examines whether learning dissipates with physical evi-
dence but nds no evidence in favor of this hypothesis. For this reason, we do not incoporate
this feature. Incorporating such a feature in our non-linear system would have substantially
complicated the estimation.
7We keep equation (??) same and change the equation (??) by augmenting wi (t). Hence
wi (t) includes not only rms ownership and local wage but also four new variables that
captures learning from own experience and learning from other rms. Then equations (??)
and (??) are also changed since state variables 
di are augmented too.
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Figure 5: Additional Learning Channels
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(Ahn, Khandelwal and Wei, 2011). It is natural to ask whether they have
helped to reduce the probability of market failure. Data show that around 20%
of Chinese export transactions or 2% of the export value in sectors 8525-8528
during 2000-2006 were carried out by intermediaries. Because we do not live in
a world without intermediary rms, we cannot formally estimate the probability
of market failure in a world without intermediaries.
We can gauge the importance of intermediary rms in export pioneering
activities in the following way: we focus on a subsample with direct producers
only. More specically, we exclude those new markets where the rst exporter is
an intermediary rm, and pretend intermediary rms do not exist even if they
are follower rms. With these modications, we re-compute the probability of
market failure and report it in Figure 6. As we can see, without giving credit to
intermediary rms in conquering new markets, the probability of market failure
tends to be moderately higher than the baseline. In any case, the probability
of missing pioneer is not too high in an absolute case. Since intermediary rms
can be formed with market forces, even a high probability of market failure in
the absence of intermediaries would not be a solid base for government actions.
3.F Common Markets
We have dened a market as a pair of a 6-digit product and a country. However,
some countries have formed a customs union or a common market. As Table 6
shows, there are ve common markets during our sample period of 2000-20028 .
Members within these common markets enjoy free trade and sometimes free
movement of labor and capital; they also maintain a common set of tari¤s and
customs regulations against imports from non-member countries. One could
make a case for assuming that only one discovery cost needs to be paid to enter
any member country. Once an exporter reaches one member country, it can
costlessly reach all other member countries in the same customs union.
8Member countries of CARICOM include Antigua, Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados,
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad, Tobago.
Member countries of CACM include Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua.
Member countries of COMESA include Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius,
Namibia, Rwanda, the Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia.
Member countries of EC include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK.
Member countries of MERCOSUR include Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay.
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Figure 6: Excluding intermediary rms
Common Market Regions
Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) Other western hemisphere
Central American Common Market (CACM) Other western hemisphere
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Africa
European Community (EC) Rest of Europe
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) Other western hemisphere
Table 6: Common Markets in the Year of 2000
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Country Export value (mil USD) Growth decomposition
YR2000 YR2002 Extensive Intensive
China 7664.164 12600 5% 95%
[1234] [1448]
Brazil 1341.453 1486.028 17% 83%
[191] [255]
India 37.415 64.376 45% 55%
[232] [280]
Japan 14700 15600 3% 97%
[1385] [1365]
Poland 655.624 1134.188 4% 96%
[86] [83]
Czech Republic 347.731 814.687 4% 96%
[396] [430]
Italy 894.722 1187.632 15% 85%
[1168] [1253]
Table 7: Growth Decomposition for China and Other Similar Economics,
HS8525 to 8528 (In brackets: Number of product-country pairs)
We now investigate the consequence of this assumption for our main con-
clusion. Specically, we treat a common market as a single destination country
and re-identify markets accordingly. With this new denition of destinations,
444 new markets were conquered during 2000-2002. We re-estimate the struc-
tural model, re-compute the probability of market failure, and report the main
results in Figure 7. Compared to the baseline case, we nd that this extension
also tends to result in a lower probability of missing pioneer.
3.G Possible Biases from Using Chinese Data
The third concern is that China might have superior export performances than
other countries in sector 8525 to 8528, resulting in less observed market failure.
By superior export performance, we mean the export growth from extensive
margin (export to new product-country pairs) might be much greater than that
from intensive margin (export to existing product-country pairs) in China than
in other similar countries. If this is true, the use of Chinese data would produce
a very low and unrepresentative probability of market failure. To check whether
such problem exists, we decompose China and its cohortsexport growth from
2000 to 2002 into extensive and extensive margins. The results are listed in
Table 7. It is obvious that China didnt stand out in terms of extensive margin
growth when compared with Brazil, India, Japan, Poland, Czech, and Italy.
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Figure 7: Treating a Customs Union as a Single Country
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